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INTRODUCTION
Desperate times may breed desperate measures, but when do desperate measures
undertaken as a response to an emergency trigger the Fifth Amendment’s requirement
that the government provides just compensation when it takes private property for
public use?1 The answer to that question has commonly been posed as a choice be-
tween the “police power”—a sovereign government’s power to regulate property’s use
in order to further the public health, safety, and welfare2—and the eminent domain
* Robert H. Thomas is the Joseph T. Waldo Visiting Chair in Property Rights Law at
William & Mary Law School and practices with Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert in
Honolulu, Hawaii. LL.M. Columbia Law School; JD University of Hawaii. He writes about
takings, land use, and property law at https://www.inversecondemnation.com.
1 See Robert Higgs & Charlotte Twight, National Emergency and the Erosion of Private
Property Rights, 6 CATO J. 747, 747 (1987) (“Much of the reduction [of private property
rights] occurred episodically, as governmental officials took control of economic affairs
during national emergencies—mainly wars, depressions, and actual or threatened strikes in
critical industries.”).
2 “Police power” describes everything a sovereign government can do. See Haw. Hous.
Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1984). It even might be said to encompass the
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power, the authority to seize private property for public use with the corresponding
requirement to pay compensation.3 But that should not be the question. After all,
emergencies do not increase government power, nor do they necessarily alter
constitutional rights,4 and an invocation of police power by itself does not solve the
compensation question but is merely the predicate issue: all governmental actions
must be for the public health, safety, or welfare, in the same way that an exercise of
the eminent domain power must be for a public use.
This Article provides a roadmap for analyzing these questions, hoping that it
will result in a more consistent approach for resolving claims for compensation that
arise out of claims of emergencies. This Article analyzes the potential takings claims
stemming from emergency measures, mostly under the current takings doctrine. Which
types of claims are likely to succeed or fail? In “normal” times, it is very difficult to
win a regulatory takings claim for compensation. In the midst of emergencies—real
or perceived—the courts are even more reluctant to provide a remedy, even when
they should, and emergencies are a good time to make bad law, especially in takings
law. Can a better case be made analytically for compensation?
Part I summarizes the economic “flattening the curve” principle that motivates
takings claims for compensation. Part II sets out the prevailing three-factor Penn
Central standard for how courts evaluate claims that a health, safety, or welfare
measure “goes too far” and requires compensation as a taking, examining the
character of the governmental action, the impact of the action on the owner, and the
extent of the owner’s property rights.5 Deep criticism of the Penn Central standard
is beyond the scope of this Article, and here, I accept it as the default takings test.6
But I argue that the government’s motivation and reason for its actions—generally
reviewed under the rational basis standard—should not be a major question in
eminent domain power. See id. at 240 (“The [Fifth Amendment’s] ‘public use’ requirement
is thus coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police powers.”).
3 See U.S. CONST.amend.V. The Fifth Amendment conditions the federal government’s
takings power. See Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 243–44,
250–51 (1833) (noting a wharf owner’s argument that the city’s diversion of water pursuant
to its police power could support a Fifth Amendment claim but holding that the Fifth
Amendment only limited the actions of the national government). The Fourteenth
Amendment extended the just compensation requirement to the states as part of due process
of law. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235, 241 (1897).
4 See Steven M. Silva, Closed for Business—Open for Litigation?, NW. U. L. REV.:
NULRNOTE (Apr. 29, 2020), https://blog.northwesternlaw.review/?p=1361 [https://perma.cc
/5LS5-EPY8] (“First, it must be recognized that the Constitution exists even in an emergency.
The Constitution expressly permits some alterations to our ordinary system of rights during
times of war—for example, the Third Amendment provides differing provisions for the quarter-
ing of soldiers in times of peace versus times of war—but those alterations are baked into the
system, the Constitution does not disappear in war. And a pandemic is not even a war.”).
5 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124–25 (1978).
6 The Supreme Court has deemed Penn Central the default test for regulatory takings.
See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538–39 (2005).
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takings claims. Rather, as this Article argues in Part III, the government’s emer-
gency justifications should be considered as part of a necessity defense, not subject
to the low bar of rational basis, but a more fact and evidence-driven standard of
“actual necessity.”7 Part IV attempts to apply these standards and examines the various
ways that emergency actions can take property for public use: commandeerings,
occupations of property, and restrictions on use. I do not conclude that the approach
will result in more (or less) successful claims for compensation, merely a more
straightforward method of evaluating emergency takings claims than the current
disjointed analytical methods.
In sum, this Article argues there is no blanket immunity from the requirement
to provide just compensation when property is taken simply because the government
claims to be acting in response to an emergency, even though its actions and reasons
may satisfy the rational basis test. Instead, claims that the taking is not compensable
because of the exigency of an emergency should only win the day if the government
successfully shows that the measure was actually needed to avoid imminent danger
posed by the property owner’s use and that the restriction on use was narrowly
tailored to further that end.
I. JUST COMPENSATION: FLATTENING THE ECONOMIC CURVE OF TAKINGS
The Just Compensation Clause democratizes the costs of public uses and benefits.
When private property is used or acquired by the public against the will of the owner,
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require the government to provide just com-
pensation.8 The overarching purpose of the takings doctrine is to “flatten the curve”9
of the economic impact of impressing private property involuntarily into public
service: “The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not be taken
for a public use without just compensation was designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.”10 It takes an economic burden that
otherwise would be shouldered by a single property owner and spreads the cost to
the entire taxpaying public.
7 See TrinCo Inv. Co. v. United States, 722 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
8 U.S.CONST.amend.V (stating “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation”); see Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R., 166 U.S. at 235, 241 (finding that the
just compensation requirement extends to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
9 “Flatten the curve” is the popular description for the theory of spreading out over time
the number of coronavirus patients to prevent limited medical services from being over-
whelmed. See Brandon Specktor, Coronavirus: What is ‘Flattening the Curve,’ and Will it
Work?, LIVE SCI. (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.livescience.com/coronavirus-flatten-the-curve
.html [https://perma.cc/ST86-82JG] (“In epidemiology, the idea of slowing a virus’ spread so that
fewer people need to seek treatment at any given time is known as ‘flattening the curve.’”).
10 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
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In other words, the takings doctrine is not a direct limitation on the government’s
power to acquire property or to regulate it for the public good. Rather, the Just Com-
pensation Clause merely forces an evaluation of the actual cost of the government’s
action by distributing the economic burden to the benefitted public.11 It forces the
government to ask, “Can we afford this?” The principle driving the analysis is whether
it is fair to require an owner to shoulder the entire economic burden of publicly worthy
regulations that restrict the use of property.12 As Justice Holmes famously wrote in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, “We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public
desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire
by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.”13
But the compensation imperative is not limited to the paradigmatic governmen-
tal action triggering compensation—cases of actual physical invasion or seizure
where the government recognizes its obligation to pay compensation.14 The Supreme
Court has acknowledged that there are “nearly infinite variety of ways in which
government actions or regulations can affect property interests.”15 Compensation is
not limited to those instances in which the government is affirmatively acquiring
property. It also includes situations in which the government does not exercise
eminent domain, but its actions to regulate for public health, safety, and welfare
under the police power affect property’s use and value nonetheless.16 In these types
of takings, the government does not acknowledge any obligation to provide compen-
sation.17 The compensation requirement is triggered when the effect of governmental
action is “so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster.”18
For example, if the government causes private property to flood, it must pay com-
pensation.19 If a municipal ordinance requires the owners of apartment buildings to
11 See id.
12 See id.; Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
13 260 U.S. at 416.
14 This is not a new concept. See, e.g., Gardner v. Vill. of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 164
(N.Y. Ch. 1816) (requiring the municipality to compensate riparian property owner before
implementing an ordinance rerouting a stream away from the owner’s land).
15 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 31 (2012).
16 See, e.g., United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 318–19, 328 (1917) (citing United States
v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 470 (1903)) (finding that the character of the government’s invasion
may constitute a taking, even when it does not directly appropriate the title to property).
17 See, e.g., Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2179 (2019); Pumpelly v.
Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 181 (1871) (rejecting the argument that no taking
was possible because the defendant had not exercised eminent domain power and was acting
pursuant to the state’s regulatory power).
18 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005).
19 See, e.g., Cress, 243 U.S. at 328 (“Where the government by the construction of a dam
or other public works so floods lands belonging to an individual as to substantially destroy
their value there is a taking within the scope of the Fifth Amendment.” (quoting United
States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 470 (1903))).
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allow the fixture of cable television equipment, compensation is required.20 If the
government requires the owner of a private marina to allow public boating under the
government’s navigation power, compensation is required.21 If environmental regu-
lations require an owner to leave their property “economically idle,” compensation
is required.22
This principle—that an exercise of sovereign power other than eminent domain
may also be a taking—was hardly novel in 1922, because there had been a long tra-
dition of courts recognizing the government’s obligation to indemnify owners who
suffered an invasion of their private property for the public good. In 1606, for example,
Lord Edward Coke famously noted that a homeowner could not stop the King’s
“saltpeter men”23 from entering private property and damaging a home or barn when
searching for saltpeter, a key ingredient in gunpowder.24 Gunpowder manufactured
from domestic saltpeter was essential for the defense of the realm, and the King’s
men could enter and remove it, despite the destruction they frequently caused to
homes, outhouses, and barns in the process.25 But the sovereign’s prerogative to do
so was limited by the principle that agents “are bound to leave the inheritance of the
subject in so good plight as they found it.”26 In short, the government’s invocation of
its sovereign powers does not automatically insulate it from the obligation to provide
compensation if that exercise indirectly and unintentionally results in a taking.
II. PENN CENTRAL
To determine whether compensation is required, courts do not treat the power
invoked as dispositive, but instead focus on the extent of the impact of the govern-
ment’s actions on the owner’s rights.27 In other words, to prove entitlement to
compensation, a property owner need not object to the government’s reason for the
20 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438 n.16, 441
(1982) (finding that even a de minimis permanent physical occupation is a compensable taking).
21 See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 165–66, 180 (1979).
22 See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
23 See generally What Is a Saltpeter Man?, FIREARMS HIST., TECH. & DEV. (Feb. 23,
2016), https://firearmshistory.blogspot.com/2016/02/what-is-saltpeter-man.html [https://
perma.cc/C4S8-EL3N] (explaining the history and occupation of “saltpeter men”); Michael
Miner, Early Gunpowder Was Made from the ‘Pisse’ of Church Ladies, and Other Historical
Tidbits (Jan. 29, 2016, 1:56 PM), CHI. READER, https://www.chicagoreader.com/Bleader/ar
chives/2016/01/29/early-gunpowder-was-made-from-the-pisse-of-church-ladies-and-other
-historical-tidbits [https://perma.cc/W5HW-K7GQ].
24 See The Case of the King’s Prerogative in Saltpetre (1606) 77 Eng. Rep. 1294, 1294–95;
12 Co. Rep. 12, 12–13.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 1295–96; 12 Co. Rep. at 12–13 (“They ought to make the places in which they
dig, so well and commodious to the owner as they were before.”).
27 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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action or regulation, but merely the effect. That is why an injunction is not the usual
remedy in most of these cases.28 In some instances, it is easy to conclude that gov-
ernmental action requires compensation. Outright seizures, for example.29 By contrast,
whether a regulation or other action short of an affirmative seizure triggers compen-
sation has defied simple explication ever since the Supreme Court first expressly
recognized regulatory takings claims in Pennsylvania Coal.30 In a 1978 decision,
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, the Court first established the
three-part, fact-intensive list of factors used to determine whether a governmental
action, other than an exercise of eminent domain, requires compensation:
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the
Court’s decisions have identified several factors that have partic-
ular significance. The economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of
course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the
governmental action. A “taking” may more readily be found
when the interference with property can be characterized as a
physical invasion by government, than when interference arises
from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good.31
28 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536–37 (2005). In that case, the Court
attempted to clear up some of the doctrinal confusion in takings, explaining:
As its text makes plain, the Takings Clause “does not prohibit the taking
of private property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of
that power.” In other words, it “is designed not to limit the governmental
interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensa-
tion in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.”
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314–15 (1987)). In certain circumstances, declaratory or injunctive
relief may be available. See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522 (1998) (“Based on the nature
of the taking alleged in this case, we conclude that the declaratory judgment and injunction
sought by petitioner constitute an appropriate remedy under the circumstances, and that it is
within the district courts’ power to award such equitable relief.”); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Env’t Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 71 n.15 (1978) (“While the Declaratory Judgment Act
does not expand our jurisdiction, it expands the scope of available remedies. Here it allows
individuals threatened with a taking to seek a declaration of the constitutionality of the
disputed governmental action before potentially uncompensable damages are sustained.”).
29 See, e.g., Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 3–6 (1984) (outlining
the multiple ways in which the federal government takes property with compensation: straight
takings, Declaration of Taking (quick take), by special statute, and by summary physical pos-
session and ouster of the owner).
30 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415–16 (1922).
31 438 U.S. at 124 (emphasis added) (first citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590, 594 (1962); and then citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)).
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Penn Central was a regulatory takings case, and the test is universally applied to
those cases, and not to direct seizures or physical invasions.32 But because the Court
considers it the default test33 to determine whether a government action requires
compensation (with Justice O’Connor even referring to it as the “polestar”34) and
because the Takings Clause’s flattening the curve rationale applies to all takings—
affirmative condemnations and regulatory takings—in this Article, I will consider
every emergency taking situation under the three-part Penn Central test, even though
the Court provided little guidance as to what the factors mean or how litigants and
the lower courts should apply this “storied but cryptic formulation.”35 This is not to
agree that the Penn Central framework is the optimal lens by which to analyze every
claimed taking (or even a good lens); that is beyond the scope of this Article, and
I leave to others those criticisms.36 The Court apparently continues to believe the
Penn Central test is the way to evaluate takings, and so here I shall too.37
32 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 323 (2002)
(“[The] longstanding distinction between acquisitions of property for public use, on the one
hand, and regulations prohibiting private uses, on the other, makes it inappropriate to treat
cases involving physical takings as controlling precedents for the evaluation of a claim that
there has been a ‘regulatory taking,’ and vice versa.”).
33 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538–39; supra note 6.
34 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 326 n.23 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.
606, 633 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[O]ur polestar . . . remains the principles set
forth in Penn Central itself,” which “provide[] important guideposts that lead to the ultimate
determination whether just compensation is required.”).
35 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537.
36 For a default test applied in an overwhelming majority of these cases, almost no one
staunchly defends it, even those who advocate for a deferential judiciary in takings. See, e.g.,
John D. Echeverria, Is the Penn Central Three-Factor Test Ready for History’s Dustbin?,
LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Jan. 2000, at 3, 3; Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension
of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 232 (2004) (“Penn Central hardly
serves as a blueprint for a municipality or a court seeking to conform to constitutional doc-
trine.”). And that is putting it gently; others do not give it such soft treatment, describing it
as “inconsistent” and “unprincipled.” See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public
Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 93 (1986) (Penn Central’s “‘totality of the circumstances’
analysis masks intellectual bankruptcy”); Gideon Kanner, Making Laws and Sausages: A
Quarter-Century Retrospective of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 13
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 679, 680, 734 (2005) (asserting that the Court lacked jurisdiction
in Penn Central and reached out to create a test that was of “dubious provenance and [was]
inconsisten[t] with the Supreme Court’s preexisting taking jurisprudence”); see also R.S.
Radford & Luke A. Wake, Deciphering and Extrapolating: Searching for Sense in Penn Central,
38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 731, 732 n.8 (2011) (cataloguing at least a dozen articles over a five-year
period with various scholars attempting to decipher Penn Central’s meaning); William W.
Wade, Theory and Misuse of Just Compensation for Income-Producing Property in Federal
Courts: A View from Above the Forest, 46 TEX. ENV’T L.J. 139, 142 n.19 (2016) (“Thousands
of words by hundreds of litigators, judges and scholars including the author have sought to
explicate the Penn Central test.”).
37 The Court has repeatedly declined to review cases in which the Penn Central test is
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There is no reason the test cannot be applied to understand why, in cases of
affirmative seizures, the government owes compensation—not because it voluntarily
provides it, but because Penn Central’s application of the Fifth Amendment’s
negative command compels it: the “character of the governmental action” factor is
so oppressive that even seizures of a minimal amount of property require compensa-
tion.38 The compensation requirement is “self-executing” and once there is a taking,
the government must provide compensation.39 Finally, even though some courts do
not consider the Penn Central factors as true factors to balance, but as a conjunctive
“and” test where a property owner must show all three (a “one strike rule,” as one
commentator has called it),40 for purposes of this Article, I will treat Penn Central
as a true “factor” test applied holistically, where more support for one element may
offset less of another.41
challenged: the latest example is Smyth v. Conservation Commission of Falmouth. See generally
119 N.E.3d 1188 (Mass. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 667 (2019).
38 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434–35, 438
n.16 (1982) (invasion by tiny cable box required compensation); see also Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (“A ‘taking’ may more readily be found when
the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government . . . .”).
39 First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315
(1987) (quoting United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980)).
40 See Adam R. Pomeroy, Penn Central After 35 Years: A Three Part Balancing Test or
a One Strike Rule?, 22 FED. CIR. BAR J. 677, 680–99 (2013) (conducting a survey of cases
citing Penn Central, which indicated that although most courts do not discuss all three Penn
Central factors, those that do are more likely to engage in a true balancing test). Penn
Central is by no means the only way to approach takings questions. Some courts adopt their
own categorical rules within the Penn Central framework. See, e.g., Love Terminal Partners,
L.P. v. United States, 889 F.3d 1331, 1343–45 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (a property owner not making
a profit cannot prove a taking, notwithstanding their reasonable investment-backed ex-
pectations), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2744 (2019); Diversified Holdings, LLP v. City of Suwanee,
807 S.E.2d 876, 887 (Ga. 2017) (zoning is not a “fertile ground” for takings claims). Others
pay lip service to the Penn Central factors but apply them incorrectly. See, e.g., State v.
Basford, 119 So. 3d 478, 481–82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (applying Penn Central to “take
into consideration everything”); In re New Creek Bluebelt, Phase 3, 65 N.Y.S.3d 552, 561
(App. Div. 2017) (applying only two of the three Penn Central factors). Still other courts—
finding the Penn Central factors inadequate, confusing, or not compatible with their state
constitution’s purpose—chart a different course, abandoning entirely the Penn Central
framework to apply their own standards for state law regulatory takings. See, e.g., Dep’t of Soc.
Servs. v. City of New Orleans, 676 So. 2d 149, 154 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (a taking occurs when
a regulation destroys a “major portion” of the property’s value); Am. W. Bank Members,
L.C. v. State, 342 P.3d 224, 235–36 (Utah 2014) (a taking occurs “when there is any substan-
tial interference with private property which destroys or materially lessens its value, or by which
the owner’s rights to its use and enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged or de-
stroyed” (quoting Utah Dep’t of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 275 P.3d 208, 208 (2011))).
41 For excellent treatment of each of the Penn Central factors, see David Crump, Takings
by Regulation: How Should Courts Weigh the Balancing Factors?, 52 SANTA CLARAL.REV.
2021] EVALUATING EMERGENCY TAKINGS 1153
A. Character of the Governmental Action
The character of the governmental action inquiry examines the nature of the
action by assessing its impact on the owner’s property rights.42 The character of the
governmental action does not mean the government’s reasons.43 It is not a substitute
for a due process or rational basis test.44 It merely asks the nature of the action: Is
it a regulation of property use?45 Does it result in a transfer of title to private prop-
erty?46 Does the owner retain title, but is nevertheless being required to open up their
property to others?47 Does it require the owner to destroy their property for the
public good?48 Are the owner’s rights being interfered with temporarily, perma-
nently, or indefinitely?49 Two words of caution:
First, in evaluating claims for compensation, an inquiry about the character of
the governmental action should not be read as inviting a court to make a searching
inquiry into the government’s motives. Even when a fundamental right is involved
or there is some indication that an improper purpose is afoot, that is a different
inquiry.50 Generally, government actions to protect the health, safety, and welfare
of the public are presumed valid, and courts are waved off by the rational basis test
from any kind of truly meaningful judicial inquiry.51 A takings analysis mostly
admits the public good and seeks compensation. Determining that the government’s
action has a public character is but the first step in the takings analysis, and to
demand compensation the property owner must admit the government action has a
1, 26–35, 39–42 (2012) (arguing that public purpose should not be a factor, that physical
invasion is an “obsolete” factor, that the economic impact is the “most important” factor, and
that certain government actions are “minor factors”).
42 Michael Lewyn, Character Counts: The “Character of the Government Action” in
Regulatory Takings Actions, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 597, 598 (2010).
43 See id.
44 Crump, supra note 41, at 8.
45 See Lewyn, supra note 42, at 598–99.
46 See, e.g., Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1984) (re-
cordation of lis pendens after the filing of an eminent domain lawsuit was not a taking because
it did not restrict other uses of the land).
47 See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987).
48 See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 273 (1928).
49 See, e.g., Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831; Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 427–35 (1982).
50 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993).
51 For a recent example of this unfortunate approach, see Support Working Animals, Inc.
v. DeSantis, 457 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1215 (N.D. Fla. 2020) (“The enactment of Amendment
13 represents a valid exercise of Florida’s police power and is therefore not a ‘taking.’ Through
Amendment 13, Florida has prohibited Plaintiffs’ property from being used in a particular
manner that the State has determined to be contrary to the health, morals, or safety of the com-
munity. Whether Amendment 13’s purpose was to protect the health and welfare of racing
dogs or to prohibit wagering on dog races, Amendment 13 is a legitimate exercise of Florida’s
police power.”).
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proper public character.52 That is why the usual remedy for takings is compensation,
not invalidation of the action.53 A property owner objecting to the exercise of
eminent domain may dispute the public use or purpose of the taking and seek to halt
it, but such objections are rare and even then are reviewed with a laughably minimal
level of judicial scrutiny.54 Similarly, a property owner may challenge an exercise
of regulatory police power, but the government’s purpose is reviewed under the
same low bar unless the evidence shows that something other than the government’s
stated reasons is at play.55 In order to be a taking for which compensation must be
provided, all government action must serve a public purpose.56 If it does not, the
action is invalid as a matter of due process of law, and not, in the first instance,
compensable as a taking.57 In short, the character of the governmental action is not
the due process test rewritten and imported into the takings equation; the character
of the governmental action inquiry focuses elsewhere.
The second caution is related. The character of the governmental action is but
the first question in the takings inquiry, not the only one. Unfortunately, however,
many courts stop at Penn Central’s character factor, concluding that because the
government is exercising its police power, there is no taking.58 Relying on past
Supreme Court decisions, courts reason that the restrictions on the use of property
are not “takings” because the loss is merely the incidental inconvenience of owning
property.59 As Justice Holmes put it in Pennsylvania Coal, “Government hardly
could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished
52 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536–37 (2005) (Takings doctrine “is
designed not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to
secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.”
(quoting First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 314–15 (1987))); Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796, 802 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (“Thus, claimant must concede the validity of the government action which is the basis
of the taking claim to bring suit under the Tucker Act.” (first citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491; then
citing Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987); and then citing Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184
(1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982))).
53 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537.
54 But see Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env’t Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 71 n.15 (1978)
(property owner may challenge uncompensated taking by declaratory judgment); Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 167–69 (1979) (owner challenged taking in federal court).
55 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537; Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477–78, 488
n.20 (2005) (challenges to public use are reviewed for a rational basis unless there is evi-
dence that the stated public use is pretextual).
56 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477.
57 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548–49 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
58 See J.P. Burleigh, Just Compensation and the Police Power, U. CIN. L. REV. (Apr. 8,
2020), https://uclawreview.org/2020/04/08/just-compensation-and-the-police-power [https://
perma.cc/3M6N-ZFVQ]; Pomeroy, supra note 40, at 680–99.
59 See, e.g., First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.,
304, 320 (1986).
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without paying for every such change in the general law. As long recognized, some
rights are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power.”60
But that is just one piece of the compensation inquiry.
In Mugler v. Kansas, the state outlawed the manufacture of intoxicating liquor
by adopting a regulation under the state’s police power, which did not offend due
process.61 In dicta, the Court also noted it was not a taking requiring compensation
because the losses in the property’s value by virtue of its restrictions for the public
health, safety, or welfare were merely an “incidental inconvenience.”62 In Miller v.
Schoene, the character of the governmental action was arguably more compelling
(or, more accurately, more immediate), as the government there was seeking to
eradicate a fungus that threatened an important part of the state’s economy.63 The
state ordered the destruction of otherwise unthreatened cedar trees without compen-
sation because they served as a “host plant” to a disease harmful to nearby apple
trees.64 The Court concluded that the destruction order was a valid exercise of the
police power and held that courts should not question too hard the government’s
assertion that the action was needed.65 Whether an action is a valid exercise of
government power to limit liberty or regulate property for the public health, safety,
and welfare, however, is a much different inquiry than the character of the govern-
mental action Penn Central factor.
But because many courts have conflated the two, they mistakenly transform the
takings question into a single factor. For example, in Kam-Almaz v. United States,
government agents temporarily seized the plaintiff’s laptop at the border “for re-
view” at a border stop because he was a “person of interest,” promising to return it
shortly.66 They did, but while the government possessed it, the hard drive failed.67
Kam-Almaz sought compensation for a taking because the laptop’s hard drive was
where he stored all of his critical business data, and the drive’s failure resulted in his
inability to do business.68 Similarly, in AmeriSource Corp. v. United States, the
plaintiff was a prescription drug distributor.69 As part of the government’s criminal
investigation of a third party, it seized AmeriSource’s drugs as possible evidence.70
Eventually, the prosecution went nowhere, and the government returned the drugs
to AmeriSource.71 But by then, the expiration date had lapsed and the drugs were
60 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
61 123 U.S. 623, 657 (1887).
62 Id. at 670.
63 276 U.S. 272, 277 (1928).
64 Id. at 278.
65 See id. at 280–81.
66 682 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
67 Id.
68 Id. at 1367.
69 525 F.3d 1149, 1150 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1126 (2009).
70 Id.
71 Id. at 1151. In a subsequent case, Innovair Aviation Ltd. v. United States, 632 F.3d 1336,
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useless, and as a consequence, worthless.72 In both AmeriSource and Kam-Almaz,
the Federal Circuit held that the character of the government action—law enforce-
ment—meant that the seizures simply could not be takings.73 The court in Ameri-
Source concluded: “Although the precise contours of the principle are difficult to
discern, it is clear that the police power encompasses the government’s ability to
seize and retain property to be used as evidence in a criminal prosecution.”74 The
court was right on one thing: this rationale does indeed lack “precise contours”
because it makes little analytical sense. Concluding that a seizure is not a taking
requiring compensation because it is not an exercise of eminent domain power but
the police power, gets analytically nowhere because inverse condemnation is, by
definition, a regulatory taking that results from an exercise of some power other
than the power of eminent domain.75
The rationale employed by the Federal Circuit in Kam-Almaz and AmeriSource
would lead to some odd results if applied to other more-well-known examples where
the Supreme Court concluded that regulation might lead to takings liability. Public
boating access cannot be a taking because the Corps of Engineers was protecting
navigation.76 Mandatory cable box installation cannot be a taking because New York
City was promoting public access cable television.77 Protecting endangered species
could not be a taking because the government was exercising its commerce power.78
Rendering useless a state-recognized property interest cannot be a taking because
it was an exercise of the police power to prevent sinkholes.79 In each of these
examples, the Court—whatever the ultimate outcome (taking, no taking)—never
reasoned that simply because the power being exercised was something other than
eminent domain, there could never be a taking. Instead, the outcome in those cases
1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1147 (2012), the Federal Circuit determined
that the Court of Federal Claims lacks subject matter jurisdiction in these kinds of cases be-
cause the statute creates a comprehensive administrative system to review in rem forfeitures
under the statute.
72 AmeriSource Corp., 525 F.3d at 1151.
73 Id. at 1154; Kam-Almaz, 682 F.3d at 1371.
74 AmeriSource Corp., 525 F.3d at 1153 (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 309–10
(1967)).
75 See T.S. Baumgardner, Comment, “Takings” Under the Police Power—the Develop-
ment of Inverse Condemnation as Method of Challenging Zoning Ordinances, 30 SMU L.
REV. 723, 724 (1976).
76 Cf. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179–80 (1979) (holding that the
government could not force private landowners to open up waterways to the public without
compensation).
77 Cf. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438 (1982) (finding
cable installation to be a taking).
78 Cf. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67–68 (1979).
79 Cf. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412–13, 415 (1922) (The Kohler Act enacted
pursuant to state’s police power went “too far.”).
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as it was originally conceived would cut in favor of finding liability when regulation
substantially impairs an income property’s rate of return.”86
Unfortunately, instead of factoring the use or value lost as a result of govern-
mental action as a part of the equation, most courts have transformed this factor into
an all-or-nothing proposition. If the property’s economic use or value is completely
impaired—the legendary Lucas “wipeout” where a regulation deprives the owner
of “all economically beneficial use” of property and the claim is analyzed without
examining any of the remaining two Penn Central factors—the owner gets compen-
sated.87 But for anything less than a 100% economic loss, the owner is categorically
out of luck.88 Most courts evaluate this question as part of a preliminary determina-
tion of “what property” is being taken and then again as part of an evaluation of the
owner’s economic loss.89
This latter thread has resulted in some courts moving the needle on the economic
impact factor so far as to conclude that even a regulation that results in a complete
loss of present use is not a Penn Central–qualifying economic impact, because the
property has theoretical value.90 That value? “Investment use.”91 Someone might be
willing to pay something for property that is presently useless because of an existing
government regulation, in the hope that the government might change the regulation
86 Radford & Wake, supra note 36, at 738 (observing that “the decision is virtually silent
as to how [the economic impact] prong should be evaluated and weighed”).
87 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015, 1019.
88 For example, in a series of decisions, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
focused on the “total and immediate” impact of federal statutes that temporarily imposed
massive financial liabilities for landowners. See Cienega Gardens v. United States (Cienega
VIII), 331 F.3d 1319, 1323, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2003). But four years later a different panel
ruled that it was inappropriate to focus the temporary takings analysis on the time frame for
which the federal restrictions were imposed—holding that Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc.
v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency requires consideration “of the overall value of the property”
over the course of its life. See Cienega Gardens v. United States (Cienega X), 503 F.3d 1266,
1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002)), cert. dismissed, 554 U.S. 938 (2008).
The difference between these two approaches is of tremendous practical importance—which
may literally make or break a temporary takings claim. See CCA Assocs. v. United States,
667 F.3d 1239, 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Ultimately, the difference between the Cienega X
and Cienega VIII methodology is the difference between an 18% and 81% economic impact,
a substantially different result stemming solely from our change in the economic analysis
between the two cases.”). The Federal Circuit stated: “If the net income over the entire
remaining life of the mortgage is the denominator there is no way that even a nearly complete
deprivation (say 99%) for 8 years would amount to severe economic deprivation when
compared to our prior regulatory takings jurisprudence.” Id. at 1247.
89 See Robert H. Thomas, Restatement (SCOTUS) of Property: What Happened to Use
in Murr v. Wisconsin?, 87 UMKCL.REV. 891, 898 (2019) (noting that the more expansively
a plaintiff’s “property” is defined, the less likely she will be able to prove a taking); see also
Eagle, supra note 84, at 631.
90 See Leone v. County of Maui, 404 P.3d 1257, 1277 (Haw. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S.
Ct. 917 (2019).
91 See id.
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and allow some economically beneficial use in the future.92 But whether there has
been a taking is a matter of loss of use, while the compensation owed for any taking
is more a matter of fair market value.93
C. Expectations: Distinct or Reasonable
The final factor examines the nature of the property rights at stake. Penn Central
held that “the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations” is one of the factors to consider.94 Yet somehow, just a short time
after Penn Central, the Court was speaking of “reasonable” expectations, without ex-
plaining what, if any, difference there might be.95 Since that time, “reasonable”
mostly stuck, and the Court has never revisited it.96 However, there is a critical differ-
ence between “distinct” expectations (which focus on the property owner’s actual
actions) and “reasonable” expectations (which focus on an objective view of the gov-
ernment action), and the shift from distinct to reasonable has resulted in courts focusing
on whether it is “reasonable” for a property owner to expect to be free of even highly
restrictive regulations, not the owner’s actual investment-backed conduct or reliance.97
This factor invites an inquiry into the property interest at stake; what “stick” has
been allegedly taken? Most courts treat this inquiry separately as a preliminary
question, not part of the expectations factor.98 “The critical terms [in takings cases]
are ‘property,’ ‘taken’ and ‘just compensation,’”99 and most courts approach such
cases by tracking the text of the Fifth Amendment.100 First, by requiring the claimant
to plead and prove that she owns “private property,”101 after which either the finder
92 See David L. Callies & Ellen R. Ashford, Knick in Perspective: Restoring Regulatory
Takings Remedy in Hawai’i, U. HAW. L. REV., Winter 2019, at 136, 148 (“[T]he [Hawai I]
Court blithely determined ‘that investment use is a relevant consideration in a takings
analysis’ which, if true, is a factor only in partial, not total, regulatory takings cases.” (citing
Leone, 404 P.3d at 1277)).
93 See, e.g., Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949) (“For purposes
of the compensation due under the Fifth Amendment, of course, only that ‘value’ need be
considered which is attached to ‘property,’ but that only approaches by one step the problem
of definition.” (footnote omitted)).
94 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
95 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
96 See, e.g., Love Terminal Partners, L.P. v. United States, 889 F.3d 1331, 1344 (Fed. Cir.
2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2744 (2019).
97 See Wade, supra note 36, at 142 n.21 (“This change [from distinct to reasonable] has
confounded subsequent courts’ views of reasonable financial expectations with plaintiffs’
reasonable notice of regulatory prohibitions. Conversion of Penn Central’s distinct investment-
backed expectations to reasonable notice of rules eviscerated the evaluation of severity of
economic impact.” (citing Cienega X, 503 F.3d 1266, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. dismissed,
554 U.S. 938 (2008)).
98 See, e.g., Cienega X, 503 F.3d at 1289.
99 United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377 (1945).
100 See, e.g., id. at 377–78.
101 See, e.g., Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
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of fact or the court determines whether the property was “taken.”102 If it was, the fact
finder also determines what compensation is “just.”103 For example, the Federal Circuit
concluded that there is a two-step approach to takings claims, where the first step
is for a court to determine “whether the plaintiff possesses a valid interest in the prop-
erty affected by the governmental action, i.e., whether the plaintiff possessed a ‘stick
in the bundle of property rights.’”104 That approach is understandable, given the ob-
vious syllogism in the Fifth Amendment’s text, but in my view unnecessarily recursive,
because the expectations factor is the better place to evaluate Justice Holmes’s
Pennsylvania Coal admonition that “Government hardly could go on if to some
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every
such change in the general law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under
an implied limitation and must yield to the police power.”105 Most courts wrongly
frontload the expectations inquiry and turn it into a legal question resolved by a
judge, that the restrictions on the use of property are not “takings” because the loss
is merely the “incidental inconvenience” of owning property.106 But expectations,
the very fact-specific inquiry about what steps the plaintiff actually took that back
up her claim that she expected that her property could not be taken away without
compensation, should be left to the fact finder.107 The regulatory climate may be a
part of that inquiry, but it should not be the only part as courts have erroneously
concluded. But as a result, the fact-intensive inquiry envisioned by Penn Central has
in most courts turned into yet another one-strike rule in which the very action being
challenged is considered part of the owner’s expectations, or as a “background prin-
ciple of state law.”108 For purposes of this Article, I focus on “distinct.”
(stating that there is a two-step approach to takings claims, where the first step is for a court
to examine the plaintiff’s property interest), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 906 (2003); Res. Invs.,
Inc. v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 447, 478 (2009) (“Before assessing plaintiffs’ categorical
takings claim, this court must, as a threshold matter, determine whether plaintiffs possessed
a property interest protected by the Fifth Amendment.”), aff’d, 785 F.3d 660 (Fed. Cir.
2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2506 (2016).
102 See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 720–21
(1999) (“[W]e hold that the issue whether a landowner has been deprived of all economically
viable use of his property is a predominantly factual question . . . [for] the jury.” (citation
omitted)).
103 See id. at 721.
104 Boise Cascade Corp., 296 F.3d at 1343 (quoting Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. Ammon, 209 F.3d
1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000)) (stating that there is a two-step approach to takings claims, with the
first step asking whether the plaintiff possesses a property right); Res. Invs., Inc., 85 Fed. Cl. at
478 (“Before assessing plaintiffs’ categorical takings claim, this court must, as a threshold matter,
determine whether plaintiffs possessed a property interest protected by the Fifth Amendment.”).
105 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
106 See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 670 (1887).
107 See City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 720–21 (holding that the deprivation of economic
use is generally a question of fact).
108 See, e.g., Love Terminal Partners, L.P. v. United States, 889 F.3d 1331, 1345 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (“The reasonable, investment-backed expectation analysis is designed to account for
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D. Penn Central Applied
Two state court decisions illustrate how courts consider and apply the Penn
Central factors. The first is the Minnesota Supreme Court’s ruling in Zeman v. City
of Minneapolis.109 There, the court reversed the court of appeals’ conclusion that the
city’s revocation of Zeman’s rental licenses for his apartment building because his
property had been the subject of multiple disorderly use complaints was a taking.110
Although not an emergency measure, the court applied the three Penn Central
factors.111 The court concluded the character of the government action—nuisance
abatement to protect the public health and safety—“favors the city.”112 Although the
court found the purpose of the revocation “paramount,” it did not (as some courts do)
stop there, but also analyzed the other two Penn Central factors.113 The economic
impact of the revocation on the owner was “substantial” and prevented him from
making the best use of it (his existing use, an apartment building).114 It was unlikely
he could rezone it to some other use, nor could he likely sell it “given the economically
depressed nature of the neighborhood.”115 The owner’s long use as a rental also demon-
strated his expectations were not simply inchoate hopes but had been backed up by
actual investment of time and money.116 Thus, the character of the governmental action
factor favored the city, but the other two factors “militate[d] towards a decision in
Zeman’s favor.”117 The court concluded that “[a] harm-prevention regulation, if not
a ruse for a state purpose other than protecting the public from noxious harm or
illegal activity, is a powerful rationale militating against finding a taking.”118 The
property owners’ expectation that the regulatory regime in existence at the time of their ac-
quisition will remain in place, and that new, more restrictive legislation or regulations will not
be adopted.”), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2744 (2019); Rancho de Calistoga v. City of Calistoga,
800 F.3d 1083, 1090–91 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding that the loss of a “mere” $4.7 million not
a taking because “when buying a piece of property, one cannot reasonably expect that property
to be free of government regulation such as zoning, tax assessments, or, as here, rent control”);
Cienega X, 503 F.3d 1266, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[T]he plaintiffs could not reasonably
have expected the change in regulatory approach.”), cert. dismissed, 554 U.S. 938 (2008).
109 See generally 552 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1996).
110 Id. at 549–50.
111 Id. at 552.
112 Id. at 554 (first citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661–62 (1887); and then citing
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 488–93 (1987)). As set out
above, I think this is the wrong approach to the meaning of “character of the government
action.” See supra Section II.A.
113 Zeman, 552 N.W.2d at 553–54.
114 Id. at 553.
115 Id.
116 See id.
117 Id. at 554.
118 Id. (citing Bruce W. Burton, Regulatory Takings and the Shape of Things to Come:
Harbingers of a Takings Clause Reconstellation, 72 OR. L. REV. 603, 618–19 (1993)).
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court considered the harm-preventative rationale for zoning regulations as weighing
strongly in favor of the government.119
Although the California Court of Appeal reached a different result in Lockaway
Storage v. County of Alameda, it also applied the three Penn Central factors in a
more correct way than most courts.120 Lockaway purchased agriculturally zoned land
for use as a boat and vehicle storage facility, an alternate conditional use in agricul-
turally zoned land.121 For over a decade, the property had been used as such pursuant
to a series of Conditional Use Permits (CUPs).122 In 2000, however, the voters of the
county approved an initiative, which prohibited the development of storage facilities
unless also approved by public vote.123 The ordinance contained a provision allowing
“minimum development” if the prohibition would deprive an owner of its statutory
or constitutional rights.124 It also contained a provision exempting existing develop-
ments and parcels that have received “all necessary discretionary County and other
approvals and permits”—in other words, those developments that had “vested.”125
When Lockaway applied for a new CUP, the county declined it, because
Lockaway had not obtained a building permit and started construction prior to the
effective date of the initiative ordinance (it had not vested under California law).126
After exhausting administrative remedies, Lockaway sued in California state court
for a writ of mandate, allowing it to proceed with development, and for inverse
condemnation and civil rights violations.127 The trial court issued the writ, because
the development was “squarely under the protections” of the vested rights exemp-
tion even though a building permit had not issued, because a building permit is
ministerial and not discretionary.128 Thus, Lockaway was allowed to proceed with
development.129 After a trial applying the Penn Central factors to determine whether
there had been a temporary taking, the court concluded, “[T]he County’s regulatory
action had a ‘substantial, negative economic impact’ on Lockaway’s use of the
property, had ‘materially interfered with Plaintiffs’ distinct, investment-backed
119 See id. (“A reviewing court must look to the nature of the regulation with an eye on its
purpose and the probability of achieving that purpose with this regulation. If the regulation
is drawn to prevent harm to the public, broadly defined, and seems able to achieve this goal,
then a taking has not occurred.” (citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. 470, 488–93 (1987))).
120 See 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 611, 622–26 (Ct. App. 2013).
121 Id. at 611.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 612.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 612, 614.
126 See id. at 613–14.
127 Id. at 614.
128 Id.
129 Id.
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expectations,’ and that its conduct could not be justified as a normal regulatory
mistake.”130 The court of appeal affirmed the entire judgment, including the amount
of compensation.131 The court applied all of Penn Central’s three factors and held that
although the initiative did not render Lockaway’s property worthless, it did deprive
it of a “return on its investment that it ‘reasonably expected from the intended
use.’”132 The court also affirmed the “investment-backed expectation” analysis
because “Lockaway purchased the property only after the County expressly confirmed
that Lockaway could rely on the 1999 CUP to develop a storage facility.”133 Finally,
the county’s “showstopping U-turn” (first working with Lockaway to further its
development plans, and then doing an about-face) satisfied the character of the
governmental action factor:
The County did not take any action to shut down the Lockaway
project in December 2000 when Measure D went into effect.
Instead, it encouraged Lockaway to continue its development ef-
forts for 18 months. Then, in September 2002 the County changed
its position and announced that the project had been doomed
since December 2000 because Lockaway had not obtained all
permits and commenced construction before Measure D’s effec-
tive date. In taking this new stand, the County refused to even
consider whether Section 22 exempted the Lockaway project.134
The court concluded the county’s behavior was “manifestly unreasonable.”135
III. NECESSITY
Determining that the government’s action has a public character is but the first
step in the takings analysis,136 and the character of the governmental action is not a
130 Id. at 615.
131 Id. at 611.
132 Id. at 624–25.
133 Id. at 625.
134 Id. at 625–26.
135 Id. at 625. As in Zeman, I do not agree that the character of the governmental action
factor signals an inquiry into the government’s motive, only the way that its actions intrude
on the plaintiff’s property. See Zeman v. City of Minneapolis, 552 N.W.2d 548, 553–54
(Minn. 1996); see, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)
(“A ‘taking’ may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized
as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.” (citing
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946))).
136 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536–37 (2005) (noting that the takings
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substitute for a due process inquiry. It does not invite an evaluation of the relative
merits of the government’s actions or motives, only the nature of the intrusion into
an owner’s property rights.137 That inquiry is simply one part of the calculus. So how
to consider an assertion that the action should be afforded extraordinary—indeed
dispositive—weight because it is undertaken in reaction to an emergency? Put
another way, to what degree must a court defer to the government’s claim that what
it is doing is “necessary”?
If viewed simply as a recasting of the Due Process and Public Use Clauses’
rational basis test or the character of the government action Penn Central factor, this
principle may be so elastic as to swallow up a compensation rule, especially if—as
many courts do—the government justifiably claims the action is very necessary,
even compelling. It would be very difficult for a court to conclude that in any public
emergency, the government’s reaction does not survive the rational basis test.138 All
actions of government to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public begin
with an assumption that the action is valid, and courts are prohibited by the rational
basis test from any kind of searching inquiry into the government’s motives, unless
a fundamental right is involved, or there is some indication that an improper purpose
is afoot.139 Thus, an invocation of “emergency” seems to add little to the public
purpose or utility analysis, which is already such a low bar that nearly anything
conceivably qualifies. The inquiry seems to lead elsewhere.
But courts consistently misapply the takings test in emergency situations, most
often treating it as dispositive, cutting off further inquiry even though an invocation
of police power—responding to an emergency or otherwise—is not an exception to
the just compensation requirement.140 Indeed, the entire regulatory takings doctrine
is premised on the idea that certain otherwise valid police power actions intrude “too
far” into property rights and as a consequence require compensation.141 The most recent
example of this analysis is the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Lech v. Jackson, in which
the court determined that a police action that resulted in massive damage to a private
residence was not a compensable taking.142 There, the police pursued a fleeing shop-
lifter into the Lech family home.143 The shoplifter holed up, refusing to surrender.144 In
doctrine “is designed not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se,
but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting
to a taking” (quoting First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 314–15 (1987))).
137 See id. at 538–39.
138 See Higgs & Twight, supra note 1, at 753.
139 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534
(1993) (“Facial neutrality is not determinative.”).
140 See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
141 Id. at 415 (The Kohler Act enacted pursuant to state’s police power went “too far.”).
142 791 F. App’x 711, 712 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 160 (2020).
143 Id. at 713; Burleigh, supra note 58.
144 Lech, 791 F. App’x at 713.
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the course of dislodging him, the police tactical unit team nearly destroyed the
home.145 The Tenth Circuit concluded that the owner was owed no compensation for
a taking, concluding that the local government was exercising the police power, and
there is no taking where the government is exercising the police power.146 This court
and the others which approach the takings question the same way have turned what
should be an ad hoc analysis based on the facts of each case into a categorical rule
of no compensation if the government is exercising its police powers (which it, by
definition, must be).147
Miller v. Schoene is probably mostly responsible for this, as the case is viewed
as concluding that police power measures are arguably more compelling (or, more
accurately, more immediate) than run-of-the mill regulations, and are therefore not
compensable.148 There, the government was seeking to eradicate a fungus that
threatened an important part of the state’s economy.149 While that certainly seems
more pressing than, say, a zoning ordinance, under the rational basis test the courts
are not supposed to qualitatively weigh the asserted government purpose or the
means chosen to advance it.150 In Miller, Virginia ordered the destruction of other-
wise unthreatened cedar trees without compensation because they could carry a
disease harmful to nearby apple trees.151 The court concluded the destruction order
was a valid exercise of the police power, and courts should not do a searching
inquiry into the government’s assertion that the action was needed.152 The important
government interest there was the preservation of the apple trees over the cedar
trees—a choice the state was entirely free to make, unrestrained by the Due Process
Clause.153 The government’s power was not enhanced by virtue of the emergency,
and this was a typical exercise of police power.154 That due process rationale has
been extended to the separate compensation question.155
145 Id.
146 Id. at 719.
147 See id.
148 See 276 U.S. 272, 277, 279 (1928).
149 Id. at 278–79.
150 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477–78, 488 n.20 (2005).
151 Miller, 276 U.S. at 277–78.
152 See id. at 279–81.
153 See id. at 280 (finding that the power of the government to prefer one interest “over
the property interest of [another], to the extent even of its destruction, is one of the dis-
tinguishing characteristics of every exercise of the police power which affects property”).
154 See id. (“We need not weigh with nicety the question whether the infected cedars con-
stitute a nuisance according to the common law; or whether they may be so declared by
statute.”); see also Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 409–11, 414 (1915) (finding that
prohibiting the operation of existing brickyards in some but not all parts of a city was not a due
process violation, and in “the absence of a clear showing” of improper purpose, courts “must ac-
cord good faith” to the government’s claim it barred brickyards as a police power measure).
155 See Miller, 276 U.S. at 277.
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Not every jurisdiction takes that approach, however. For example, in Brewer v.
Alaska, the Alaska Supreme Court correctly shifted the focus in these cases from the
government’s reasons for undertaking the action to whether those actions were
justified in light of the flattening the economic curve rationale under the state
constitution’s takings clause.156 There, property owners sought compensation after
the state set fires on their land to stop or prevent a wildfire.157 As the wildfire ap-
proached their properties, the state set fire to vegetation around the owners’ homes to
deprive the wildfire of fuel.158 When the wildfire passed through the area, the homes
were not damaged.159 The homeowners alleged their properties were not actually
threatened by the wildfire and that “the State could have ‘undertaken . . . the damag-
ing fire suppression activities on bordering State-owned lands’ instead.”160 The trial
court entered summary judgment for the state, and regarding the claim on which we
are focused—the takings claim—held that the state’s burning of the vegetation could
not be a taking because it was a valid exercise of the police power.161
The Alaska Supreme Court reversed, concluding that although the state acted
within the lawful exercise of its police powers because its entry onto private land to
set the backfires was authorized by state statutes, the benefit of preventing or
limiting wildfires “is of benefit to the public as a whole regardless of whether only
individual landowners are immediately benefitted.”162 The court, relying on the
public use rationale,163 rejected the state’s alternative argument that the backfires
were for private benefit only because they were designed to protect the plaintiffs’
homes.164 The court also expressly rejected the “intended beneficiary” test under the
Fifth Amendment,165 set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in National Board of Young
Men’s Christian Associations v. United States, under which the use by the govern-
ment of private property is not a taking if a “private party is the particular intended
beneficiary of the governmental activity.”166 The Alaska court held that the Alaska
Constitution’s takings clause provided broader protection to landowners, and the court
“d[id] not believe that YMCA’s ‘intended beneficiary’ test adequately reflect[ed] the
156 341 P.3d 1107, 1109 (Alaska 2014).
157 Id. at 1110.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. (omission in original).
161 Id.
162 Id. at 1112.
163 See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240, 244 (1984) (The police power
and the public purpose under the Public Use Clause are “coterminous,” and “[i]t is not essential
that the entire community, nor even any considerable portion, . . . directly enjoy or parti-
cipate in any improvement in order [for it] to constitute a public use.” (omission and second
alteration in original)).
164 Brewer, 341 P.3d at 1112.
165 Id. at 1114 & n.32.
166 395 U.S. 85, 92 (1969).
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broad protections of Alaska’s Takings Clause.”167 The Alaska court undertook what
I think is a more defensible approach to the compensation issue, concluding, “[W]e
decline to hold that every valid exercise of the police power is justified by the
doctrine of necessity and results in a noncompensable taking.”168 In other words, the
government’s mere invocation of the police power emergency is not a blanket defense
to a takings claim, at least under Alaska’s constitution. The court correctly viewed
the justification for the government’s action as simply fulfilling the public use
requirement for takings or the rational basis for due process.169
Although Miller teaches that courts are to give broad latitude to the govern-
ment’s assertion that its action is necessary and tailored to the situation, the Court
in that case did not address—much less resolve—the compensation question, which
was not presented in the case.170 For a more compelling approach to the takings
issue, the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion in Department of Agriculture & Con-
sumer Services v. Mid-Florida Growers, Inc. provides a more consistent and
satisfying analysis.171 There, the Department of Agriculture ordered the owners of
healthy citrus trees to destroy them in order to eradicate citrus canker that, in the
future, might have infested the plants.172 The tree owners sought compensation for
a taking of their healthy trees.173 The Department asserted it could not be liable for
a taking because it was exercising the police power, and “the trees were destroyed
in order to prevent a public harm.”174 The court rejected the argument, viewing the
destruction as a public benefit, not as preventing a public harm:
We, however, agree with the district court’s conclusion that de-
struction of the healthy trees benefited the entire citrus industry
and, in turn, Florida’s economy, thereby conferring a public benefit
rather than preventing a public harm. Although this factor alone
may not be conclusive, we have previously recognized that if a
regulation creates a public benefit it is more likely that there is
a taking.175
167 Brewer, 341 P.3d at 1114 & n.32.
168 Id. at 1114.
169 Id. at 1112 (“Because the [fires] were set in the exercise of the State’s police powers,
the damage they caused was for a public use for purposes of the Takings Clause.”).
170 See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279–80 (1928) (“For where, as here, the choice
is unavoidable, we cannot say that its exercise, controlled by considerations of social policy
which are not unreasonable, involves any denial of due process.”).
171 See generally 521 So.2d 101 (Fla.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988); Dep’t of Agric.
& Consumer Servs. v. Bogorff, 35 So.3d 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
172 Mid-Fla. Growers, Inc., 521 So.2d at 102 (noting that the Department of Agriculture
ordered the destruction of the trees, rejecting a quarantine as an alternative).
173 Id.
174 Id. at 102–03.
175 Id. at 103 (citation omitted) (citing Dept. of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Mid-Florida
Growers, Inc., 505 So. 2d 592, 595 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)).
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The court did not expressly apply the Penn Central factors (the takings claim was
apparently made under the Florida Constitution), but referenced an ad hoc fact-
intensive inquiry.176
The dissent took issue with that gloss on the state’s action, asserting, “The spread
of citrus canker is a public harm; the department took steps to prevent the spread and
thereby prevent a public harm.”177 But whether the police power glass was half-full,
as the majority saw it,178 or half-empty, as the dissent viewed it,179 really is not criti-
cal, because any valid public purpose that survives rational basis review should be
enough to result in compensation without a court weighing the government’s intent
or the relative wisdom of its actions. Compensation is morally neutral—not, as dissent-
ing Chief Justice McDonald viewed it—dependent on differentiating the govern-
ment’s duty to prevent harm from its power to confer benefit:
The department had the duty to take emergency measures to
prevent an immediate harm—the spread of canker. In viewing
its actions from an emergency standpoint, those actions were not
unreasonable. The trial judge appeared to base his judgment of
inverse condemnation solely on the basis that healthy trees were
taken. The issue is not whether the plaintiffs’ trees were actually
healthy, but rather whether the government, acting responsibly,
had reasons to conclude that they might not have been and that
it was necessary to destroy them to prevent the spread of a
deadly disease. Viewed in this light, the evidence fails to support
a claim for inverse condemnation.180
In other words, necessity.181
176 See id. at 104–05.
177 Id. at 105 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).
178 See id. at 102–03 (majority opinion). For one legal scholar who has applied the half-
full rationale to emergency takings, see F.E. Guerra-Pujol, The Kelo Case Provides a Strong
Legal Argument for Takings Clause Lockdown Compensation, DISCOURSE (Apr. 24, 2020),
https://www.discoursemagazine.com/politics/2020/04/24/the-kelo-case-provides-a-strong
-legal-argument-for-takings-clause-lockdown-compensation/ [https://perma.cc/HLP8-QK6H].
179 See Mid-Fla. Growers, Inc., 521 So.2d at 105–06 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).
180 Id. at 106.
181 In Miller v. Schoene, the Supreme Court noted there was no real difference between
the government’s power to prefer one interest over another, or even destroy property. 276
U.S. 272, 279–80 (1928). That is “one of the distinguishing characteristics of every exercise
of the police power which affects property.” Id. Highlighting the dissenting Justice’s
erroneous view in Mid-Florida is his assertion that a predicate to a finding there was a taking
is a determination that the “department’s orders and regulations enacted to combat the spread
of the canker, at the time they were made, were unnecessary or arbitrarily and capriciously
applied.” Mid-Fla. Growers, Inc., 521 So.2d at 106 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).
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But necessity is more of a tort defense than a principle of liability.182 The necessity
doctrine, however, has unfortunately worked its way into the primary takings calculus,
as kind of a “super public use” justifying denial of compensation without more.183
But the character of the governmental action asks about the nature of the action and
its effect, not its intent.184 It does not mean that if the government really needed to
act, that compensation is thereby cut off. There are no degrees of police power, with
some exercises of the power being given more weight than others. Police power is
police power. Emergencies are not exceptions to that rule. Everything government
does should be for the health, safety, and welfare of the public. That power is not
given greater judicial deference in an emergency, nor is it decreased in “normal”
times. Otherwise, it is just inviting everything to be deemed an emergency, and
because of the related tendencies for regulation to fill all voids, and government
taking the path of least resistance, even normal times will breed desperate mea-
sures.185 The proper place to consider such necessity arguments is not in the context
182 It should not be terribly surprising that a court finds the line between “tort” and “takings”
to be very blurry. Many courts have done so lately. See, e.g., Long v. South Dakota, 904
N.W.2d 502, 520 (S.D. 2017) (concluding that a government-caused flood was a taking, not
a trespass); St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 887 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(finding that Hurricane Katrina flooding was a tort, not a taking: “While the theory that the
government failed to maintain or modify a government-constructed project may state a tort
claim, it does not state a takings claim”), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 796 (2019); see also Letica
Land Co., LLC v. Anaconda-Deer Lodge Cnty., 435 P.3d 634, 637–38 (Mont. 2019) (When
the government occupied property under its mistaken claim to own it, it was not a physical
taking, but a tort; the court applied the same reasoning as the Federal Circuit in Katzin.);
Katzin v. United States, 908 F.3d 1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir.) (rejecting takings liability for the
government acting like the property’s owner, even though it was not), cert. denied, 140 S.
Ct. 443 (2018); Williams v. Moulton Niguel Water Dist., 232 Cal. Rptr. 3d 356, 363–66 (Ct.
App. 2018) (noting that the allegation of physical invasion damage to copper pipes by the
government’s addition of chemicals sounded in tort, not takings); Ada Cnty. Highway Dist.
v. Brooke View, Inc., 395 P.3d 357, 359–62 (Idaho 2017) (noting that the construction
damage caused by the Highway District to property adjacent to—but not part of—a road
project for which it took property by eminent domain was not covered in the condemnation
case, but should be addressed as a tort); In re Willis Ave. Bridge Replacement v. City of
New York, 111 N.Y.S.3d 595, 597–98 (App. Div. 2019) (analyzing a government-caused
flood as tort, not a taking); City of Daphne v. Fannon, 303 So.3d 114, 116–17, 123, 125 (Ala.
2019) (finding no takings liability for a government-caused flood because it was not rea-
sonably foreseeable).
183 See, e.g., Brewer v. State, 341 P.3d 1107, 1109 (Alaska 2014).
184 See Mid-Fla. Growers, Inc., 521 So.2d at 103.
185 For example, New York’s rent control (a temporary measure) is now entering its
second century after a post–World War I housing emergency. Note, The Constitutionality of
Rent Control Restrictions on Property Owners’ Dominion Interests, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1067, 1067–68 (1987) (“The Supreme Court first upheld rent control decades ago as a
temporary, emergency response to the housing shortages and rent increases that followed the
two world wars.”).
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of either due process or the Penn Central takings factors. Instead, the necessity of
government action should be part of an affirmative defense to these claims, its
burden to prove, to a clearer and more stringent standard than rational basis.
For example, in TrinCo Investment Co. v. United States, the Federal Circuit held
that a property owner plausibly pleaded a takings claim resulting from the Forest
Service’s intentional burning of private timberland in order to reduce fuel for
ongoing wildfires.186 The Forest Service’s fires destroyed thousands of acres of
timber, valued at approximately $6.6 million.187 The plaintiffs claimed that the
wildfire would not have burned their land, but the Court of Federal Claims dis-
missed the complaint because the doctrine of necessity absolved the Forest Service
of takings liability because it asserted it was necessary to fight the wildfire with
fire.188 The Federal Circuit disagreed, instead concluding that although necessity
may apply in some circumstances, it was never blanket absolution to takings
liability.189 This “stretches the doctrine too far.”190 The court concluded that neces-
sity may be a defense to a taking, but that it is the government’s burden to prove the
emergency measure was in reaction to “an actual emergency,” and the government’s
response was “actually necessary.”191
As addressed above, however, every taking by the Govern-
ment in the name of fire control does not automatically qualify
as a necessity sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the neces-
sity defense. The necessity defense is just what it says it is: a
defense. It has always required a showing of imminent danger.
The use of the word “necessity” in the title is no accident. The
defense requires both an actual emergency and an imminent
danger met by a response that is actually necessary. Not every
seizure of a private citizen’s property will qualify.192
Like the necessity doctrine in tort, which if proven, immunizes the tortfeasor from
damages, an invocation of necessity in takings is not a part of the plaintiff’s burden, but
is squarely on the defendant to prove as an excuse to the presumption of compensation
if the Penn Central factors say “taking.”193 The Federal Circuit held that “certain
186 722 F.3d 1375, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
187 Id. at 1377.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 1378 (citing Bowditch v. City of Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18–19 (1880)).
190 Id.
191 Id. at 1380.
192 Id.
193 In the famous California Supreme Court decision Surocco v. Geary, the court held that
Geary, the Alcalde of San Francisco, was not liable in tort for the “blowing up with gun-
powder, and destroying [plaintiff’s] house and store, with the goods therein” in the course
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prerequisites must be met before the doctrine of necessity can be applied to absolve
the Government of a duty to compensate a party for lost property.”194 There must be
both “imminent danger and an actual emergency giving rise to the actual necessity.”195
IV. EVALUATING EMERGENCY TAKINGS
In this Part, I look at various scenarios of emergency takings through the lens
of the Penn Central factors and the necessity defense to highlight the touchpoints
that should be used to evaluate claims for compensation for emergency takings.
A. Commandeerings: Compensation
First, the easy cases for compensation. Even in emergencies, when private property
is affirmatively acquired or occupied for public use, the owner is entitled to compen-
sation.196 That a seizure of property is done in an emergency does not relieve the
government of its compensation obligation.197 An “[e]mergency does not increase
granted power or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed upon power granted or
reserved.”198 After all, “The Constitution was adopted in a period of grave emer-
gency.”199 The most straightforward situation is where the government temporarily
or permanently uses or seizes property during an emergency for the public’s use. A
motel to use as a hospital, for example.200 A hotel to provide shelter for medical
of fighting “a public conflagration then raging in the city of San Francisco.” 3 Cal. 69, 70,
74 (1853). The court held that the plaintiff’s building was doomed anyway and entered judg-
ment for Geary. Id. at 74.
194 TrinCo Inv. Co., 722 F.3d at 1378.
195 Id. at 1380.
196 U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating “nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation”). Here, I assume that the government’s action is within its
powers, see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S.
579, 588–89 (1952) (deciding that the President’s power to seize steel mills during the
Korean War to prevent a strike was limited by the legislature’s authority), and that it passes
muster under the very low bar set by the rational basis test for straight takings and police power
actions that do not impact a so-called “fundamental” right, see, e.g., Kelo v. City of New
London, 545 U.S. 469, 490–91 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (challenges to public use are
reviewed for a rational basis, unless there is evidence that the stated public use is pretextual).
197 See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 16 (1949) (requiring the gov-
ernment to compensate laundry owners for the seizure of their property and equipment for
military purposes); see also Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866).
198 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425 (1934).
199 Id.
200 See, e.g., Taryn Luna, Newsom Issues Order Allowing California to Take Over Hotels
for Coronavirus Patients, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2020, 4:43 PM), https://www.latimes.com
/california/story/2020-03-12/california-governor-gavin-newsom-hotels-medical-facilities-pa
tients-meeting-requirements [https://perma.cc/X7MY-634L]; Edmund DeMarche, Newsom
Executive Order Allows California to Commandeer Hotels, Motels to House Coronavirus
Farmers Insurance Exchange v. California
Patients
See, e.g. D.C. Pays Millions to Place the Homeless in Hotels to Avoid
COVID-19. But Many Rooms Are Empty. And Others Need Them.
Four
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The only difference in California’s statutory process for compensation for commandeer-
ings is procedural: unlike eminent domain takings in which the government provides
compensation, commandeerings are treated as inverse condemnations and require
the property owner to make a claim for compensation.205 The character of the govern-
mental action in these cases is an outright seizure or use, with the attendant acknowl-
edgment of the obligation to compensate.206 With the compensation question resolved,
the application of the other two Penn Central factors is not really helpful, and the
big question in a commandeering is the amount of compensation.207 This presents
two major questions.
First, what property is compensable? For example, Kimball Laundry v. United
States involved the long-term (but ultimately temporary) takeover by the federal
government of a going-concern commercial operation for use during World War II
as a military laundry.208 The owners were forced by the commandeering to suspend
their private laundry business for the duration.209 The Army used its facilities and
equipment, and the laundry owners could not restart their business elsewhere.210 The
government recognized its obligation to provide compensation, and the issue was
the compensation owed.211 The Court concluded that the compensation requirement
only extends to property interests for which there is a market.212 And when a taking
is not permanent—but is of a known duration at the outset—the market usually
values such transactions by “the rental that probably could have been obtained.”213
Moreover, when the government acquires the business itself (as opposed to only the
business’s property), the Fifth Amendment requires compensation for the “going-
concern” or goodwill use lost by the business as a consequence.214 In short, if the
205 GOV’T § 8652 (“Before payment may be made by the state to any person in reim-
bursement for taking or damaging private property necessarily utilized by the Governor in
carrying out his or her responsibilities under this chapter during a state of war emergency or
state of emergency, or for services rendered at the instance of the Governor under those
conditions, the person shall present a claim to the Department of General Services in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the Government Code governing the presentation of claims
against the state for the taking or damaging of private property for public use, which provisions
shall govern the presentment, allowance, or rejection of the claims and the conditions upon
which suit may be brought against the state.”).
206 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
207 See, e.g., Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 6 (1949).
208 Id. at 3 (finding that the Army Quartermaster Corps “ran it as a laundry for personnel
in the Seventh Service Command” and retained most of Kimball Laundry’s employees, including
one of the owners).
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 6.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 7.
214 Id. at 11 (“In determining the value of a business as between buyer and seller, the
goodwill and earning power due to effective organization are often more important elements
than tangible property. Where the public acquires the business, compensation must be made
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commandeering affirmatively takes over a business and prevents the operator from
moving it elsewhere, compensation is owed for that loss.215 But otherwise, compen-
sation is only owed for the property itself.216 The Kimball Court wrote:
We think that the situation before us comes within this
principle. The Government’s temporary taking of the Laundry’s
premises could no more completely have appropriated the Laun-
dry’s opportunity to profit from its trade routes than if it had
secured a promise from the Laundry that it would not for the
duration of the Government’s occupancy of the premises under-
take to operate a laundry business anywhere else in the City of
Omaha. The taking was from year to year; in the meantime the
Laundry’s investment remained bound up in the reversion of the
property. Even if funds for the inauguration of a new business
were obtainable otherwise than by the sale or liquidation of the
old one, the Laundry would have been faced with the imminent
prospect of finding itself with two laundry plants on its hands,
both of which could hardly have been operated at a profit. There
was nothing it could do, therefore, but wait.217
The second issue is what measure of compensation is the owner of comman-
deered property entitled to? For example, California’s statute obligates the govern-
ment to pay “reasonable” compensation, but there is nothing suggesting this differs
from the constitutional standard of just compensation.218 To the extent that reasonable
compensation falls short of full indemnity for the property taken, the constitutional
standard prevails, and the legislature cannot limit the amount of compensation.219 In
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, Congress authorized acquisition of
a privately owned lock.220 The owner also possessed the authority to collect tolls
from river traffic.221 Congress appropriated money for compensation but directed
for these, at least under some circumstances.” (quoting Galveston Elec. Co. v. Galveston, 258
U.S. 388, 396 (1922))).
215 Id. (In the usual fee taking, the owner is “free to move his business to a new location.”).
216 Id. at 12–13 (“The taker has thus in effect assured itself of the freedom from the former
owner’s competition.”).
217 Id. at 14.
218 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8572 (West 2021) (“[T]he state shall pay the reasonable value”
of property commandeered by the Governor “during a state of war emergency or state of
emergency.”).
219 See Monogahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327 (1893) (Although
a “legislature may determine what private property is needed for public purposes . . . . the
question of compensation is judicial.”).
220 Id. at 312.
221 Id. at 314.
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that whatever amount was paid for the taking, it could not include the value of the
tolls.222 The owner appraised the value of the lock and the value of the right to
collect tolls at $450,000.223 After trial, the court awarded the owner $209,000, which
in accordance with the statute was the value of the taken lock alone, “not consider-
ing or estimating . . . the franchise of this company to collect tolls.”224
The Supreme Court rejected that approach, concluding that calculation of just
compensation is a judicial function and that a legislature can neither establish the
amount to be paid in compensation for a taking nor dictate the method used to
calculate it.225 The Just Compensation Clause requires payment of “a full and perfect
equivalent for the property taken.”226 The Court noted a Mississippi decision which
held that permitting the legislature to set or determine the amount of compensation
paid would allow it to “constitute itself the judge in its own case.”227 In short, a
statute cannot thwart or limit the self-executing right to the full measure of just
compensation.228 The right to recover just compensation for property taken for
public use in an emergency cannot be burdened by state law limitations, particularly
legislatively created limitations on providing only “reasonable” compensation.229
222 Id. at 313–14.
223 Id. at 318–19.
224 Id. at 319.
225 Id. at 327 (“By this legislation, Congress seems to have assumed the right to determine
what shall be the measure of compensation. But this is a judicial and not a legislative question.”).
226 Id. at 326.
227 Id. at 327 (quoting Isom v. Miss. Cent. R.R., 36 Miss. (7 Geo.) 300, 315 (1858)).
228 Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 17 (1933) (“[T]he right to just compensation
could not be taken away by statute or be qualified . . . .”).
229 See People ex rel. Wanless v. City of Chicago, 38 N.E.2d 743, 746 (Ill. 1941) (A court
cannot read a statute to deprive the landowner of compensation for a taking.); City of San
Antonio v. Astoria, 67 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) (finding that the legislature
may provide the method of securing payment of compensation but may not “prescribe any
procedure which would lessen the absolute obligation of the taker to compensate the owner,
‘in money,’ for the property taken”); see also Tucson Airport Auth. v. Freilich, 665 P.2d
1007, 1011 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (“The determination of the proper rate of interest, being
a part of just compensation, is necessarily a judicial function which the legislature may not
usurp.”); Redevelopment Agency of Burbank v. Gilmore, 198 Cal. Rptr. 304, 307–08 (Ct.
App. 1984) (finding that the interest rate to be allowed could exceed that specified by statute
since a constitutional right was involved); Gov’t of Guam v. 162.40 Square Meters of Land,
2016 Guam 10 ¶ 19, 29 (finding that the statutory interest rate of six percent on condemna-
tion awards does not limit the right under the Just Compensation Clause of the owner to
prove that she is entitled to a greater rate of interest); Ill. State Toll Highway Auth. v. Am.
Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 642 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ill. 1994) (“Although that statute purports
to set an interest rate at 6% per year [on compensation awards] . . . the 6% rate is not
binding.”); Booras v. Iowa State Highway Comm’n, 207 N.W.2d 566, 569–70 (Iowa 1973)
(holding that a remittitur not available in eminent domain to reduce jury’s compensation
verdict); State ex rel. Humphrey v. Baillon Co., 480 N.W.2d 673, 676 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992)
(finding that the calculation of interest on compensation is judicial function, and courts are
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B. Occupations, Seizures, and Destructions Without Proffering Compensation
Similar to commandeerings, the general rule for emergency seizures and
destructions is to provide compensation, even where, unlike commandeerings, the
government does not affirmatively acknowledge its obligation to provide it.230 There
may be limited circumstances where compensation need not be provided for the use,
seizure, or destruction of private property in extreme emergencies, such as war, but
the general rule there still favors compensation.231 The general approach is best
illustrated by Mitchell v. Harmony, where the Court noted that the military may take
property “to prevent them from falling into the hands of the public enemy; but in
order to justify the seizure the danger must be immediate and impending, and not
remote or contingent.”232 This mirrors the necessity analysis which I set out above,
in which the government bears the burden of asserting and proving the actual
necessity of the taking.233 The danger must be “pressing” (“immediate and impend-
ing, and not remote or contingent”) before private property can be “impress[ed] . . .
into the public service.”234 That case involved the army’s seizure of “wagons, mules
not bound by statutory interest rates); Manning v. Mining & Mins. Div. of the Energy, Mins.
& Nat. Res. Dep’t, 144 P.3d 87, 91–92 (N.M. 2006) (rejecting agency’s claim it was not liable
for regulatory taking because the agency lacked eminent domain power, the court noted, “leg-
islation cannot insulate the state from providing just compensation for takings . . . When a taking
occurs, just compensation is required by the Constitution, regardless of state statute.”), cert.
denied, 549 U.S. 1051 (2006); Red Springs City Bd. of Educ. v. McMillan, 108 S.E.2d 895,
900 (N.C. 1959) (Parker, J., concurring) (“Th[e] constitutional prohibition against taking
private property for public use without the payment of just compensation is self-executing,
and neither requires any law for its enforcement, nor is susceptible of impairment by
legislation.”); Mitchell v. Village of White Plains, 16 N.Y.S. 828, 829 (Gen. Term 1891) (“A
remedy for compensation contingent upon the realization of funds from taxation for benefit
within a limited assessment district does not meet the constitutional requirement.” (quoting
Sage v. City of Brooklyn, 89 N.Y. 189, 196 (1882))); Commonwealth v. Lot No. 281-5 R/W,
2016 MP 17 ¶ 31 (N. Mar. I.) (per curiam) (finding that the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands was not protected by sovereign immunity when it failed to pay a condem-
nation judgment; self-executing Just Compensation Clause prohibited legislature from refusing
to appropriate money to pay the judgment after it has taken property).
230 See Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 3 (1984); see, e.g., Katie Canales,
San Francisco Could Seize the Headquarters of Tech Giants like Salesforce and Twitter to
Use as Emergency Housing for the City’s Homeless and First Responders, BUS. INSIDER
(Apr. 16, 2020, 1:41 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/san-francisco-could-seize-pri
vate-property-covid-19-crisis-2020-4 [https://perma.cc/MUY5-GKAP]; Noam N. Levey, Hos-
pitals Say Feds Are Seizing Masks and Other Coronavirus Supplies Without a Word, L.A.
TIMES (Apr. 7, 2020, 2:07 PM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2020-04-07/hospitals
-washington-seize-coronavirus-supplies [https://perma.cc/ZS3A-D3FZ].
231 See Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 133 (1851).
232 Id.
233 See supra text accompanying notes 183–95.
234 Mitchell, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 133.
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and goods” while on campaign in enemy territory during the Mexican-American
War.235 The Court held:
There are, without doubt, occasions in which private property may
lawfully be taken possession of or destroyed to prevent it from
falling into the hands of the public enemy; and also where a
military officer, charged with a particular duty, may impress pri-
vate property into the public service or take it for public use.
Unquestionably, in such cases, the government is bound to make
full compensation to the owner; but the officer is not a trespasser.236
Like Penn Central, the Court in Mitchell concluded the takings question is
circumstance-specific, but also if an emergency “gives the right, . . . the emergency
must be shown to exist before the taking can be justified.”237 Another example of the
compensation principle is Attorney-General v. De Keyser’s Royal Hotel, Ltd., in
which, in a series of separate opinions, the House of Lords concluded that the Crown
could not seize possession of property “in connection with the defence of the realm
without paying compensation for their use and occupation.”238 When the character
of the government action is a seizure, occupation, or destruction, it is the most
compelling Penn Central factor, regardless of the extent of the loss or the owner’s
expectation of compensation.239
The Supreme Court has treated physical invasions as a distinct species of public
use of private property and has long recognized that even temporary occupations are
235 Id. at 129; see also James E. Pfander, Dicey’s Nightmare: An Essay on the Rule of
Law, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 737, 763 (2019) (“Rightly viewed as a landmark decision on
military accountability for the invasion of property rights, Mitchell v. Harmony arose from
the loss of property during the Mexican-American War.” (footnote omitted)).
236 Mitchell, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 134; cf. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 131, 138 (1978) (holding that not all restrictions on property use are takings
requiring just compensation when the restrictions are for the general welfare).
237 Mitchell, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 134.
238 [1920] AC 508 (HL) at 508 (appeal taken from Eng.).
239 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579,
588–89 (1952) (finding that the President acted outside of his powers to seize steel mills);
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882) (holding that war is not a blanket exception
to the need to provide compensation and “[n]o man in this country is so high that he is above
the law”). For an argument that Lee remains important because it emphasized the enduring
principle that in the United States no man is above the law, including the government itself,
see generally ANTHONY J. GAUGHAN, THE LAST BATTLE OF THE CIVIL WAR: UNITED STATES
VERSUS LEE, 1861–1883 (2011). As Professor Gaughan subsequently wrote, “In rejecting
the Justice Department’s argument, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the nation’s commitment
to the rule of law. . . . The fundamental lesson of United States v. Lee was that, in the
American legal system, the rule of law constrains the actions of every government officer,
including the President.” Anthony J. Gaughan, The Arlington Cemetery Case: A Court and
a Nation Divided, 37 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 1, 17 (2012).
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governed by bright-line rules, not the “few invariable rules” applicable to most
takings cases.240 The brightest of these lines is that an uncompensated physical
invasion of private property is mala in se and does not require proof of a resultant
loss of use of the property invaded.241 The compensation owed for a relatively minor
invasion may be correspondingly minor, but that is a question of valuation, not of
takings liability.242 In the paradigmatic example of the Court’s categorical rule that
all “permanent” physical invasions are takings, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., the Court was presented with a physical invasion of the most trivial
kind: a regulation requiring Loretto and other private property owners to allow
installation of a television cable “slightly less than one-half inch in diameter and of
approximately 30 feet in length,” “directional taps,” and “two large silver boxes”
(about 18” x 12” x 6”) on their apartment buildings.243 The Court held that this de
minimis physical invasion was a taking: “Teleprompter’s cable installation on
appellant’s building constitutes a taking under the traditional test. The installation
involved a direct physical attachment of plates, boxes, wires, bolts, and screws to
the building, completely occupying space immediately above and upon the roof and
along the building’s exterior wall.”244
The Court agreed that the installation served the public interest, but held that the
question of whether it triggered the Fifth Amendment’s requirement for compensa-
tion was a separate issue.245 The majority rejected the dissent’s argument that “a taking
of about one-eighth of a cubic foot of space is not of constitutional significance.”246
Instead, the Court found that the magnitude of the invasion was “not critical:
whether the installation is a taking does not depend on whether the volume of space
it occupies is bigger than a breadbox.”247 The Court reaffirmed “[t]he traditional
240 Compare Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
322 (2002) (“When the government physically takes possession of an interest in property for
some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner.” (citing
United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115 (1951))), with Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n
v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 31 (2012) (“In view of the nearly infinite variety of ways in
which government actions or regulations can affect property interests, the Court has rec-
ognized few invariable rules . . . .”).
241 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982).
242 Id. (Though the occupation was minor, the “physical occupation of an owner’s prop-
erty authorized by government constitutes a ‘taking’ of property for which just compensation
is due.”).
243 Id. at 422, 438 n.16 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 423
N.E.2d 320, 324 (N.Y. 1981)).
244 Id. at 438.
245 Id. at 426 (“We conclude that a permanent physical occupation authorized by gov-
ernment is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve. Our constitutional
history confirms the rule, recent cases do not question it, and the purposes of the Takings
Clause compel its retention.”).
246 Id. at 438 n.16.
247 Id.
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rule” that a physical invasion is a taking without regard to the size of the invasion.248
The Court held that even small permanent (or more accurately, “indefinite”) invasions
are “qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property” because “the
owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion.”249
Notably absent from the analysis was whether the permanent physical occupa-
tion resulted in any actual damage or interfered with Loretto’s uses of the five-story
building.250 There was no allegation (or proof) that the installation of the cable
equipment resulted in any loss of her use of the roof or her building, and indeed a
good argument could have been made that cable television service to Loretto’s
tenants actually enhanced her uses and the value of her building.251 Instead, the
Court viewed the invasion itself as the constitutional wrong and presumed that the
equipment installation deprived Loretto of her uses to the extent of the invasion,
even though she was free to use the rest of her property without interference:
Second, the permanent physical occupation of property forever
denies the owner any power to control the use of the property;
he not only cannot exclude others, but can make no nonpossessory
use of the property. Although deprivation of the right to use and
obtain a profit from property is not, in every case, independently
sufficient to establish a taking, it is clearly relevant. Finally,
even though the owner may retain the bare legal right to dispose
of the occupied space by transfer or sale, the permanent occupa-
tion of that space by a stranger will ordinarily empty the right of
any value, since the purchaser will also be unable to make any
use of the property.252
248 Id. at 436.
249 Id.
250 See generally id. The Court more recently rejected a distinction between permanent and
temporary physical invasion takings, concluding in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v.
United States that the temporary nature of an invasion does not automatically exempt it from
compensation. 568 U.S. 23, 38 (2012) (finding that the government-induced flooding, even if
temporary in duration, gained no automatic exemption from application of the takings clause).
251 See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 437 n.15 (noting the dissent’s argument that the regulation
“likely increase[d] both the building’s resale value and its attractiveness on the rental
market”). Loretto focused on the “relatively few problems of proof” that the traditional bright
line takings rule entails and concluded by noting that evidence about the extent of the in-
vasion (in other words, the loss of the owner’s use resulting from the invasion) was a matter
of the just compensation owed, not a question of whether there had been a taking. Id. at 437,
441 (“The issue of the amount of compensation that is due, on which we express no opinion,
is a matter for the state courts to consider on remand.”); id. at 437 (“Once the fact of
occupation is shown, of course, a court should consider the extent of the occupation as one
relevant factor in determining the compensation due.”).
252 Id. at 436 (citation omitted) (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979)); see also
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The Court reaffirmed this bright line rule in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., where it
concluded, “physical takings require compensation because of the unique burden
they impose: A permanent physical invasion, however minimal the economic cost
it entails, eviscerates the owner’s right to exclude others from entering and using her
property—perhaps the most fundamental of all property interests.”253 In short, a
physical invasion itself triggers an “incontestable” claim for compensation, which
the courts have “never den[ied].”254
Contrast that approach with United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., in which
the Court concluded that the army’s destruction of property to prevent it from falling
into the hands of the advancing enemy in World War II did not require compensa-
tion.255 Had the army not destroyed the property, the “fortunes of war” would have
resulted in the property being used by the enemy.256 In short, the war took the
property, not the government.257 The Court affirmed the dicta in United States v.
Pacific Railroad, which noted that it was not a taking for Union forces to blow up
a railroad’s bridges during the Civil War as a tactical measure “to prevent the
advance of the enemy.”258 The Court denied that this was a taking and denied
Nat’l Bd. of Young Men’s Christian Ass’ns v. United States, 395 U.S. 85, 92 (1969) (“Ordi-
narily, of course, governmental occupation of private property deprives the private owner of
his use of the property, and it is this deprivation for which the Constitution requires com-
pensation.”); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 167, 174 (1871) (After the erection
of a dam across a river by a canal company raised the level of a lake, flooding Pumpelly’s
property, the Court concluded that where property was invaded by water, the flood effectively
destroyed or impaired its usefulness and a taking occurred.); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S.
316, 328 (1917) (finding that even when a property was only affected by intermittent
floodwaters, a taking may still occur); United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 751 (1947)
(holding that a taking had occurred, even though the owner was not deprived of all economic
uses and had reclaimed most of the land after the initial flood because “no use to which
Dickinson could subsequently put the property by his reclamation efforts changed the fact
that the land was taken when it was taken and an obligation to pay for it then arose”).
253 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (first citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994);
then citing Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831–32 (1987); then citing Loretto,
458 U.S. at 433; and then citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
254 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 427 n.5 (citing Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165,
1184 (1967) (“At one time it was commonly held that, in the absence of explicit expropri-
ation, a compensable ‘taking’ could occur only through physical encroachment and occupation.
The modern significance of physical occupation is that courts, while they sometimes do hold
nontrespassory injuries compensable, never deny compensation for a physical takeover. The
one incontestable case for compensation (short of formal expropriation) seems to occur when
the government deliberately brings it about that its agents, or the public at large, ‘regularly’
use, or ‘permanently’ occupy, space or a thing which theretofore was understood to be under
private ownership.” (emphasis omitted)).
255 344 U.S. 149, 154 (1952).
256 Id. at 155.
257 See id. at 156 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
258 120 U.S. 227, 229 (1887).
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compensation.259 The destruction of the railroad bridges was a “military neces-
sity.”260 As the Court noted, “The destruction or injury of private property in battle,
or in the bombardment of cities and towns, and in many other ways in the war, had
to be borne by the sufferers alone as one of its consequences.”261 Nor are military
forces obligated to return—or pay compensation for any damage to—contraband or
property that an enemy might use to wage war.262 The same holds true when the
property taken or destroyed is enemy property.263 That principle means that some
physical occupations or destructions in emergencies are not compensable events.264
In National Board of Young Men’s Christian Associations v. United States, for
example, the Court concluded that the government was not liable for compensation
when rioters destroyed a building being occupied by soldiers during the riots.265 The
destruction can be blamed on the rioters, and the Army was trying to defend the
property, albeit unsuccessfully.266 Although the government is ordinarily liable when
it occupies property, in the “unusual circumstances” there, it was the riots and the
rioters that deprived the owner of the building’s use.267
Applying Loretto’s view of the Penn Central factors, emergency seizures or
occupations of private property should be compensable without inquiry into the
magnitude of the owner’s loss or her expectations of property and compensation,
unless the government can prove it took the property for some extraordinary reason,
such as to prevent it from falling into the hands of an enemy or being destroyed
inevitably by the emergency.268 If measures taken in war are alone not sufficient to
overcome the compensation principle, it is hard to imagine that a civil emergency
259 Id. at 240.
260 Id. at 229.
261 Id. at 234.
262 See id.
263 See Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 297, 305–06 (1909) (finding that the
destruction of property owned by U.S. corporation in Cuba to prevent yellow fever spread
to army troops was not compensable).
264 See id.
265 395 U.S. 85, 93 (1969).
266 Id.
267 See id. at 92–93. The destruction of property is not analyzed differently than a taking.
See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945) (“[T]he term ‘taken’
would seem to signify something more than destruction, for it might well be claimed that one
does not take what he destroys. But the construction of the phrase has not been so narrow.
The courts have held that the deprivation of the former owner rather than the accretion of a
right or interest to the sovereign constitutes the taking. Governmental action short of
acquisition of title or occupancy has been held, if its effects are so complete as to deprive the
owner of all or most of his interest in the subject matter, to amount to a taking.”).
268 The exigencies of the emergency may prevent the government from providing contem-
poraneous full compensation, but a delay in payment alone does not limit the power to take
for public purposes, provided the government has committed to eventually providing it. See
Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 659 (1890). It becomes a matter of the
amount of compensation owed, not whether compensation is owed at all.
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would be. This, as noted above, is a much different inquiry than the rational basis
test for whether the court should halt the seizure. It would not be enough to avoid com-
pensation to claim only that the property was destroyed to save another’s property.
The utilitarian calculus does not mean that the greater the public good, the lesser
the case for compensation, but precisely the opposite: the fact that the plaintiff’s
property was purposely sacrificed for the public good presents the better case for
compensation.269 The government may be attempting to the flatten the curve of an
emergency by seizing property, but the Just Compensation Clause stands as a bul-
wark against doing so on the backs of the individual property owner, unless the
owner was going to lose it to the emergency anyway.270 The government must prove
both the presence of an “imminent danger” and “an actual emergency giving rise to
actual necessity” of taking property.271
C. Third-Party Occupations
This Section analyzes emergency actions which are not direct government
seizures, occupations, or destructions of private property, but where instead—by
action or inaction—the government allows third parties to do so. For example, an
eviction moratorium,272 a temporary rent abeyance or rent “strike,”273 or a rent
cancellation.274 Many of the same Penn Central principles animating the analysis of
269 See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48–49 (1960).
270 See, e.g., TrinCo Inv. Co. v. United States, 722 F.3d 1375, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
271 Id. at 1378.
272 See, e.g., Jaclyn Diaz, New York Approves Eviction Moratorium Until May, NPR (Dec. 29,
2020, 6:41 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/12/29/95104
2050/new-york-approves-eviction-moratorium-until-may [https://perma.cc/SU98-6YGG].
273 See, e.g., Will Parker & Nicole Friedman, Rent Strike Planned for May 1 as Pain of
Coronavirus Deepens, WALL ST.J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/rent-strike-planned-for-may
-1-as-pain-of-coronavirus-deepens-11587988800 [https://perma.cc/F46S-GMT8] (Apr. 27, 2020,
2:07 PM); Jean Tepperman, What If They Held a Pandemic (and a Rent Strike Broke out
Instead?), E.BAY EXPRESS (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/what
-if-they-held-a-pandemic-and-a-rent-strike-broke-out-instead/Content?oid=29628380 [https://
perma.cc/32HQ-ZJU3].
274 See, e.g., H.R. 6515, 116th Cong. (2020) (“To suspend obligations of residential renters
and mortgagors to make payments during the COVID-19 emergency, and for other purposes.”);
see also Press Release, Rep. Ilhan Omar Introduces Bill to Cancel All Rent and Mortgage
Payments During the COVID-19 Pandemic (Apr. 17, 2020), https://omar.house.gov/media
/press-releases/rep-ilhan-omar-introduces-bill-cancel-all-rent-and-mortgage-payments-during
[https://perma.cc/XY2M-EV7N]. An Alexandria, Virginia, councilmember has introduced
a measure calling for a rent and mortgage moratorium. Press Release, Canek Introduces Reso-
lution Calling for Moratorium on Rent, Mortgages, and Suspension of Negative Credit Reporting
(Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.canekforcouncil.com/news/2020/4/14/aguirre-introduces-resolu
tion-calling-for-moratorium-on-rent-mortgages-and-suspension-of-negative-credit-reporting
[https://perma.cc/7XB2-LZFS].
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whether a straight commandeering or destruction of property under the emergency
power requires compensation also apply to government occupations of property.275
First, the character of the governmental action (or inaction). If viewed as a
physical occupation, a government invitation to the public to occupy private property
should be treated no differently than direct governmental occupations, because the
invitation to the public is governmental action.276 Additionally, the lack of affirma-
tive government conduct—for example, a refusal to enforce eviction or trespass
claims—does not avoid the possibility of takings liability.277 If the government
interferes with the operation of trespass or landlord-tenant law, for example, it may
be liable for a taking.278
Second, whether the character of a refusal to remove nonpaying tenants or oust
trespassers is akin to a physical occupation, triggering the Loretto rule. The Supreme
Court was confronted with a similar situation in Yee v. City of Escondido, where it
275 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
276 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179–80 (1979) (finding that a federal
government requiring owner of private marina to open it to public would be a taking); Nollan
v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 841–42 (1987) (finding that a property owner has the
right to compensation when the state allows public to access beach via private land).
277 See, e.g., Litz v. Md. Dep’t of the Env’t, 131 A.3d 923, 931 (Md. 2016) (“Upon this
review, it seems appropriate (and, in this case, fair and equitable, at least at the pleading stage of
litigation) to recognize an inverse condemnation claim based on alleged ‘inaction’ when one
or more of the defendants has an affirmative duty to act under the circumstances. Therefore,
we hold, as a matter of Maryland law, that an inverse condemnation claim is pleaded ade-
quately where a plaintiff alleges a taking caused by a governmental entity’s or entities’ failure
to act, in the face of an affirmative duty to act.”); Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The
State’s Affirmative Duty to Protect Property, 113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 347 (2014) (“While
the idea of imposing affirmative constitutional duties on the state is unorthodox as a matter
of general constitutional law, it is surprisingly consonant with underlying justifications for
the Takings Clause.”).
278 See, e.g., Preseault v. Interstate Com. Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1, 4–5, 8 (1990) (The National
Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1241, was a valid exercise of Commerce Clause authority, but
may subject government to takings liability because the Act interfered with the usual operation
of state easement law.). In Preseault v. United States, the Federal Circuit confirmed that when
an abandoned rail easement was converted into a public park, even with an issuance of notice,
just compensation still must be paid. 100 F.3d 1525, 1544–49 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Railbanking
interferes with the operation of state property law by preventing owners of land subject to
abandoned rail easements from exercising their unencumbered rights. See id. at 1529–30. Com-
pensation turns on the scope of the easement and the present use. Id. at 1555 (Clevenger, J.,
dissenting); see also Ladd v. United States, 630 F.3d 1015, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“It is settled
law that a Fifth Amendment taking occurs in Rails-to-Trails cases when government action
destroys state-defined property rights by converting a railway easement to a recreational trail, if
trail use is outside the scope of the original railway easement.”); Toews v. United States, 376
F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“It is elementary law that if the Government uses (or
authorizes the use of . . .) an existing railroad easement for purposes and in a manner not
allowed by the terms of the grant of the easement, the Government has taken the landowner’s
property for the new use.”).
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concluded that a local rent control ordinance—limiting an owner’s right to charge
market rent and stretching out the time it would take an owner to evict a tenant—
was not analyzed under Loretto.279 In Yee, property owners asserted the ordinance
worked a physical taking, because it allowed occupation of their property by third
parties (tenants) whom they could otherwise have ousted for not paying market
rent.280 Yee was a facial challenge to the rent control ordinance.281 The Court was not
also presented with a Penn Central argument.282
The Court characterized the argument:
[T]he park owner cannot evict a mobile home owner or easily
convert the property to other uses, the argument goes, the mobile
home owner is effectively a perpetual tenant of the park, and the
increase in the mobile home’s value thus represents the right to
occupy a pad at below-market rent indefinitely.283
The Yees argued, in effect, that the ordinance had, in practice, transformed their
private rentals into public housing.284 The Court rejected that characterization: this
was not a government-required occupation, but merely the owners choosing to
continue to rent their property, even after the city adopted the confiscatory ordi-
nance.285 The owners retained the right to evict, “albeit with 6 or 12 months notice.”286
Thus, the unwanted occupation, although long-term, was not a permanent ouster.287
The Court noted, however, that a “different case would be presented were the statute,
on its face or as applied, to compel a landowner over objection to rent his property
or to refrain in perpetuity from terminating a tenancy.”288 Applying the Yee Court’s
clever sleight-of-hand, measures like a rent or eviction moratorium, or inaction in
the face of a rent strike, would likely lead a court to conclude that the emergency
action is not a categorical physical occupation under the Loretto codicil to Penn
Central if the owner had “invited” the tenant onto the property before the emergency
279 503 U.S. 519, 524–25 (1992).
280 See id. at 525.
281 Id. at 528.
282 See id. at 537 (“Whether or not the ordinance effects a regulatory taking is a question
related to the one petitioners presented, and perhaps complementary to the one petitioners
presented, but it is not ‘fairly included therein.’ Consideration of whether a regulatory taking
occurred would not assist in resolving whether a physical taking occurred as well; neither of
the two questions is subsidiary to the other.”).
283 Id. at 526–27.
284 Id. at 526.
285 See id. at 527–28.
286 Id. at 528.
287 See id.
288 Id.
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measures were put in place.289 The lack of government-required occupation would
not be dispositive, even if it would add more weight on the compensation side of the
scale because owners would have both reasonable and distinct investment-backed
expectations so they could rely on existing legal processes to recover occupation of
their properties if a tenant stopped paying rent or a non-tenant trespassed.290
If rent holidays are not physical occupations, are they Lucas wipeouts? In
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, the Court
extended Yee’s ad hoc approach to regulatory takings that result in a total loss of
economically beneficial uses, if the prohibition is temporary.291 There, the agency
prohibited all development by way of two back-to-back moratoria.292 The total time
these ordinances prevented “virtually all development” was about two years and
eight months.293 The Court rejected the owner’s facial takings claim “that the mere
enactment of a temporary regulation that, while in effect, denies a property owner
all viable economic use of her property gives rise to an unqualified constitutional
obligation to compensate her for the value of its use during that period.”294 In other
words, compensation is required without examining the owner’s expectations or the
economic impact of the prohibition.295 The Court declined to adopt a per se rule,
instead concluding that “the circumstances in this case are best analyzed within the
Penn Central framework.”296 “[T]he answer to the abstract question whether a
temporary moratorium effects a taking,” the majority concluded, “is neither ‘yes,
always’ nor ‘no, never’; the answer depends upon the particular circumstances of
the case.”297 Property, the Tahoe-Sierra majority concluded, has a “temporal aspect”
included as one of the sticks in the bundle, and a government action can never be
tested by takings without consideration of the effect of the time the government
action clouded use, even if that action resulted in a total prohibition of use.298
Tahoe-Sierra is built on two assumptions that may not be applicable in cases
claiming compensation for rent abeyances.299 First, the action that is alleged to result
in a taking is truly temporary, even if in that case the cloud was years-long.300 The
Court expressly declined to review one of the questions presented by the property
289 See id.; see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441
(1982); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978).
290 See Yee, 503 U.S. at 528; Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441; Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S.
at 138.
291 535 U.S. 302, 342 (2002).
292 Id. at 306.
293 Id. at 306, 314.
294 Id. at 320.
295 See id.
296 Id. at 321.
297 Id.
298 Id. at 331–32.
299 See id.
300 Id. at 333–34.
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owner’s petition for certiorari, whether a series of temporary prohibitions become,
at some point, the functional equivalent of a permanent taking.301 Thus, it is an open
question about how temporary an emergency wipeout of rent or recovery of posses-
sion can be before it becomes “permanent.”302 The longer temporary emergency
measures are in place, the more likely it is the character of the government action
will be recognized as a permanent occupation, making the government liable for the
compensation regardless of the magnitude of a property owner’s loss.303 And even
as merely a part of the calculus, the temporary inability to collect rent, to make an
income from the property, or to recover possession from any non-rent-paying occu-
pant is a factor that, however long the duration of the emergency measure, weighs
heavily in favor of a compensation. After all, the term for the compensation for the
temporary use of property is “rent.”304
That ties to the Court’s second Tahoe-Sierra assumption, that the value of the
property would automatically recover once it emerged from beneath the use prohibi-
tion’s cloud.305 The majority supported that conclusion with “logical” economics;
in other words, an economic theory that had no apparent basis in the record of the
case: “Logically, a fee simple estate cannot be rendered valueless by a temporary
prohibition on economic use, because the property will recover value as soon as the
prohibition is lifted.”306
To that we say, “Says who?” If property naturally recovered any temporary loss
of value over time, then even affirmative temporary takings would not require
compensation (or, more accurately, the compensation owed would be zero). And the
longer the temporary moratorium lasts, the less this recovery theory holds water. Yet
in other cases, the Court recognized that temporary regulatory takings require
compensation.307 For example, the government cannot automatically avoid liability
301 Id.
302 See id. at 337.
303 See id.
304 See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 7 (1949) (“[T]he proper measure
of compensation” for a temporary taking “is the rental that probably could have been ob-
tained.”); United States v. Banisadr Bldg. Joint Venture, 65 F.3d 374, 378 (4th Cir. 1995)
(“[W]hen the Government takes property only for a period of years . . . it essentially takes
a leasehold in the property. Thus, the value of the taking is what rental the marketplace would
have yielded for the property taken.”); City of Charlotte v. Combs, 719 S.E.2d 59, 62 (N.C.
App. 2011) (“The most widely accepted measure of compensation for the taking of a temporary
easement appears to be the rental value of the property taken.” (quoting 9 NICHOLS ON
EMINENT DOMAIN § G32.08[2][a] (rev. 3d ed. 2006))); Anderson v. Chesapeake Ferry Co.,
43 S.E.2d 10, 16 (Va. 1947) (“As just compensation for a permanent taking is fair market value,
so just compensation for [a] temporary taking can only be a fair rental value.”).
305 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332.
306 Id.
307 First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 321 (1987) (“Once a court determines that a taking has occurred, the government
[may] . . . amend[] the regulation, [or] withdraw[] . . . the invalidated regulation . . . . [But]
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for a taking when it invades property simply by asserting that it did not intend for
the invasion to be permanent.308 The measure of compensation for temporary takings
is most commonly the rental value of the property,309 a recognition that even if the
long-term market for the property itself may not suffer a consequential effect by
virtue of a temporary loss of use, any rent uncollected during that time is gone and
can never be recovered as part of the property’s market price.310 And even more
fundamentally, the Court’s attempt to distinguish permanent occupations (compen-
sated “no matter how small”311) from temporary occupations (in which the duration
of the cloud is simply factored into the Penn Central calculus no matter how long)
is an exercise in metaphysical incoherence.312 To paraphrase John Maynard
Keynes’s dictum, in the long run, everything is temporary.313 Any attempt to draw
a bright line between permanent and temporary is ultimately fruitless.314 Temporal
metaphysics should be less important than the actual extent of the damage and
deprivation of use inflicted by any invasion. Any questions identifying the duration
of the occupation should be issues of compensation, not liability.315 But it does not
matter for purposes of this Article, because I am examining emergency actions under
the ad hoc Penn Central test, not trying to suggest that any per se rules govern.
This relates to Penn Central’s economic impact factor.316 The larger the loss
compared to the property’s “denominator,” whatever that might be,317 the greater the
where the government’s activities have already worked a taking . . . no subsequent action by
the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during which
the taking was effective.”).
308 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 32–33 (2012).
309 See discussion supra note 304.
310 See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 568 U.S. at 32–33; Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322–23.
311 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322–23.
312 There may be no better example of this doctrinal incoherence than in Leone v. County
of Maui, where the Hawaii Supreme Court held that because at some time in the indeterminate
future the government may back off of a regulation that deprived the owner of all uses, the
market would value such “investment value,” and therefore there was no present taking. 404
P.3d 1257, 1265, 1276–77 (Haw. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 917 (2019).
313 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 356 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“After all, ‘[i]n the
long run we are all dead.’” (emphasis removed) (quoting JOHNKEYNES,MONETARYREFORM
88 (1924))).
314 See id. at 355–56.
315 See Alan Romero, Takings by Floodwaters, 76 N.D. L. REV. 785, 798 (2000) (“[T]he
extent of impairment, like the duration of the intrusion, is not irrelevant. The greater the impair-
ment, the more compensation required. If the owner’s use of the property is not impaired at
all, then maybe no compensation should be required. But that is not because the land was not
taken. It is because justice may not require compensation for a taking that does not impair
the owner’s use at all.”); see also United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917) (“[S]o
long as the damage is substantial, that determines the question [of] whether it is a taking.”).
316 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
317 The denominator in these cases should usually be the rental property in question, not
the owner’s entire holdings. See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1945–46 (2017) (The
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likelihood of a compensable taking. If a property owner goes out of the rental
business as a consequence of the eviction moratorium, or, for example, cannot
service debt because of the loss of rental income (even temporarily), it would also
weigh heavily in favor of a claim for compensation. In Yee v. City of Escondido, the
Court noted that the invasive character of the government action “may be relevant
to a regulatory takings argument, as it may be one factor a reviewing court would
wish to consider in determining whether the ordinance unjustly imposes a burden
on petitioners that should ‘be compensated by the government, rather than remain[ing]
disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.’”318 One possible counter to even
massive losses is another concept borrowed from tort law: causation. Under this
approach, a court asks whether it was the emergency itself and its effect on the
property’s use—not the government’s reaction—that resulted in the loss.319 In the
rent abeyance situation, a court might examine whether the owner was not likely to
collect rent anyway. The Supreme Court endorsed a form of this no-harm-no-foul
approach in National Board of Young Men’s Christian Associations v. United States,
where it concluded the government was not liable for compensation because the
destruction of the YMCA could be blamed on rioters, not the soldiers who were
trying to defend it, even if unsuccessfully.320 The “unusual circumstance” of the
rioters being the cause of the destruction and depriving the owner of the building’s
use meant that they, not the government, were the responsible party.321
And what of an owner’s expectations? First, if a tenant is already in arrears on
the rent and an emergency measure forced the owner to provide the tenant housing
for the duration, the owner certainly had both reasonable and distinct expectations
that she would not need to donate her property as public housing simply because an
denominator constitutes the “property” against which the owner’s claimed loss is measured in
takings cases where the owner possesses more than a single parcel, and is determined by a host
of factors, including the “treatment of the land” under state law, the “physical characteristics” of
the properties (which includes the parcels’ topography and “the surrounding human and eco-
logical environment”), and “the value of the property under the challenged regulation.”).
318 503 U.S. 519, 531 (1992) (alteration in original) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438
U.S. at 124).
319 See Alieza Durana & Matthew Desmond, A Massive Wave of Evictions Is Coming.
Temporary Bans Won’t Help., WASH. POST (Apr. 8, 2020, 9:24 AM), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/outlook/2020/04/08/eviction-coronavirus-rent-homelessness/ [https://perma.cc
/VF4J-H9WF] (“In some cases, states have placed bureaucratic hurdles between renters and
the protections that have been passed. . . . [R]equir[ing] tenants to demonstrate they’ve been
affected by virus outbreak—either the disease itself or the mandatory business closures—
before they are shielded from eviction.”).
320 395 U.S. 85, 91–93 (1969).
321 Id. at 93. The lack of market, however, might be more of a question of the owner’s lack
of alternatives, an issue that goes to compensation for the government’s seizure and operation
of a going-concern business and the business owner’s inability to relocate. See, e.g., Kimball
Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 3, 8–9 (1949).
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emergency subsequently arose.322 Any retroactive reach-back measure may also be
independently subject to a due process challenge.323 Second, a property owner has
a reasonable expectation that they will receive a reasonable return on investment,
and a rent collection and eviction moratorium would certainly seem to interfere with
that expectation.324 Rent control has survived challenges over the decades, primarily
because it does not deprive the owner of a reasonable return, and has always been
aimed at “excess” profits.325 There seems to be a qualitative difference between a
measure that keeps rent from going up with a rising market, and a measure that sets
rent at zero, even temporarily.
Finally, although the government’s justification for its action is relevant to
asking whether a court should halt an emergency measure,326 it should not play a
large role in the takings analysis. Similar to government seizures, denying compen-
sation when the government requires occupation of property by third parties under
the Penn Central test should only be justified in extraordinary circumstances, such
as a particularized and “imminent danger” to the occupied property.327
In sum, short delays in collecting rent or on recovering possession present more
difficult cases for proving a taking requiring compensation under Tahoe-Sierra’s
theory of value recovery after a short moratorium.328 Longer delays—even if not
truly “permanent”329—present cases more likely to result in compensation, either
where the compensation sought is a significant amount of lost rent, or if the property
is lost due to a lack of cash flow that the owner reasonably expected to receive.
322 See Preseault v. Interstate Com. Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1, 23 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring) (“[A] sovereign, ‘by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property
without compensation. . . . This is the very kind of thing that the Taking Clause of the Fifth
Amendment was meant to prevent.’” (alterations and omissions in original) (quoting Webb’s
Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980))).
323 See, e.g., Regina Metro. Co. v. N.Y. State Div. of Hous. & Cmty. Renewal, 154 N.E.3d
972, 1004–05 (N.Y. 2020) (retroactive application of newly adopted legislative amendments
to rent control law held to violate due process).
324 See Note, supra note 185, at 1071–72 (“Courts also found that as long as the measures
provided for a reasonable return, they were not confiscatory and therefore did not constitute
unconstitutional takings.”).
325 See, e.g., id.; Apartment & Office Bldg. Ass’n v. Washington, 381 A.2d 588, 591 (D.C.
1977); see also Tenoco Oil Co. v. Dep’t of Consumer Affs., 876 F.2d 1013, 1020 (1st Cir. 1989)
(“[T]he takings clause imposes limits on the proper scope of rent control programs . . . .”);
Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 546, 549 (1924) (finding that the order cutting
apartment rents was inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135,
156 (1921) (“For just as there comes a point at which the police power ceases and leaves
only that of eminent domain, it may be conceded that regulations of the present sort pressed
to a certain height might amount to a taking without due process of law.”).
326 See TrinCo Inv. Co. v. United States, 722 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
327 Id.
328 See id.; Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
322 (2002).
329 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332.
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D. Restrictions on Use
The most challenging category of emergency measures for which to seek com-
pensation are those that do not outright seize or destroy property—or invite the
public to do so—but instead impose what might be characterized as a regulatory
negative use easement.330 These limit the uses that owners may make of their property
and may result in some very severe economic consequences, such as a business
going under during the pendency or as a result of an emergency shut-down order,
but do not directly interfere with the owner’s possession, title, or occupation.331 The
most current examples are the various orders nationwide requiring businesses and
activities deemed “nonessential” to close down, or serve their customers remotely
if possible, to prevent the spread of the coronavirus.332
In these cases, the character of the governmental action is regulation, not direct
destruction or occupation. Penn Central itself informs us that “[a] ‘taking’ may
more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as
a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common
good.”333 This type of emergency measure falls squarely into the latter category,
even if it is not your typical zoning or other day-to-day police power action.334 Thus,
330 See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Injunctive Relief and Damages at 5, 19–20,
Gondola Adventures, Inc. v. Newsom (No. 2:20-cv-3789), 2020 WL 1974890 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 24, 2020) (asserting a taking for California governor’s emergency order to close “non-
essential” businesses); Complaint at 2–3, Behar v. Murphy (No. 3:20-cv-05206), 2020 WL
6375707 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2020) (challenging the New Jersey governor’s emergency order
as a taking of plaintiff’s right to rent residential property, “since he cannot rent it, reach it,
nor enter it”); Complaint at 13–14, Martinko v. Whitmer, 465 F. Supp. 3d 774 (E.D. Mich.
2020) (No. 2:20-cv-10931) (alleging Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992),
and Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), takings for Michigan
governor’s shut down order); Complaint at 12, Amato v. Elicker, 460 F. Supp. 3d 202 (D.
Conn. 2020) (No. 3:20-cv-00464) (alleging Connecticut governor’s shut down order was a
taking); Complaint for Injunctive Relief Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 65 at 6, Lawrence v. State, 455
F. Supp. 3d 1063 (D. Colo. 2020) (No. 1:20-cv-00862-DDD-SKC) (alleging Colorado shut
down order was a taking); Complaint at 2, Shulmerich Bells, LLC v. Wolf (No. 20-01637)
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2020) (alleging Pennsylvania’s shut down order was a taking).
331 See, e.g., Lauren Cusimano, Four Peaks Brewing Co. Has Closed Its Scottsdale Grill
& Tap, PHOENIX NEW TIMES (May 7, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.phoenixnewtimes.com
/restaurants/four-peaks-brewing-co-has-closed-its-scottsdale-grill-and-tap-11469144 [https://
perma.cc/ZR7G-7DNC]; Jason Rose (@jasonrosepr), TWITTER (May 2, 2020, 10:50 PM),
https://twitter.com/jasonrosepr/status/1256778011124195329 [https://perma.cc/C773-EFQL]
(“One of first of too many horrible dominoes to fall: Four Peaks Scottsdale calls it quits after
16 years.”).
332 See, e.g., Friends of Danny DeVito v. Wolf, 227 A.3d 872, 876, 892 (Pa.), cert. denied,
141 S. Ct. 239 (2020).
333 Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256
(1946)).
334 See id.
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in many cases, this factor weighs against compensation.335 This factor may be weighed
differently, however, if instead of regulation, the government’s emergency measure
is a direct interference with, or revocation of, an existing entitlement or approval.336
Again, this is a different inquiry than in a challenge to the action as a violation of
due process, where courts review the merits of the government’s action, even if only
under an impossibly low bar.337
The character of the action, of course, does not resolve the takings issue entirely,
although it may inform the other factors, particularly the owner’s investment-backed
expectations. As the Court recognized in Kaiser Aetna v. United States:
While the consent of individual officials representing the United
States cannot “estop” the United States, it can lead to the fruition
of a number of expectancies embodied in the concept of “prop-
erty”—expectancies that, if sufficiently important, the Government
must condemn and pay for before it takes over the management
of the landowner’s property.338
In Kaiser Aetna, it was the federal government’s not conditioning the issuance of
a Rivers and Harbors Act dredging permit on Kaiser Aetna’s agreement to open its
private waterway to public navigation.339 Although the Court focused on the invasive
nature of public navigation, the “vested rights” and estoppel conclusion should apply
equally to regulatory measures.340 Also, as in other situations, the greater the economic
impact on the property owner, the more likely a court would require compensation,
even though nearly every court that has applied this Penn Central factor has concluded
335 See, e.g., Zeman v. City of Minneapolis, 552 N.W.2d 548, 554 (Minn. 1996).
336 See, e.g., Lockaway Storage v. County of Alameda, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 611, 613
(Ct. App. 2013) (finding that the county effectively revoked its prior assurances about a
conditional use permit).
337 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (“[T]he Court recognized
that government regulation of private property may, in some instances, be so onerous that its
effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster—and that such ‘regulatory takings’ may
be compensable under the Fifth Amendment.”); First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 316 (1987) (“While the typical taking occurs when the
government acts to condemn property in the exercise of its power of eminent domain, the entire
doctrine of inverse condemnation is predicated on the proposition that a taking may occur with-
out such formal proceedings.”); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64 n.21, 65 (1979) (Federal
power to protect endangered species measured against Takings Clause: “There is no abstract
or fixed point at which judicial intervention under the Takings Clause becomes appropri-
ate.”); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414–15 (1922) (The Kohler Act enacted
pursuant to state’s police power went “too far.”).
338 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979) (citations omitted) (first citing Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S.
308, 314–15 (1961); and then citing Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5 (1973)).
339 Id. at 168.
340 See id. at 179; Lockaway, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 626.
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that absent a 100% diminution in use and value, the regulation is merely “adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good” that all property
owners should expect as part of the social compact and inherent in the ownership of
property.341 Total economic wipeouts are certainly takings meriting compensation.342
Other less economically devastating governmental actions may also merit compensa-
tion, but courts have been very reluctant to do so absent other compelling factors.343
Even where an owner is able to establish a taking requiring compensation, the
necessity defense can be powerful in insulating emergency measures from compen-
sation.344 To reemphasize: this should not be a part of the character of the govern-
mental action factor, but the government’s burden to prove an “imminent danger”
in an “actual emergency” in which the government’s response was “actual[ly]
necess[ary].”345 Although this is a situation-specific inquiry, the courts have consid-
ered claims like this in the due process context and generally afford the government
a wide latitude in defining an emergency and tailoring the necessary response.346 For
example, if the government can force vaccinations on people who do not wish to be
vaccinated by imposing a fine (forcing them to choose between violating their
liberty interest in bodily integrity and a civil penalty), it seems likely that a court
will treat less-invasive intrusions into property rights equally deferentially when also
done in the name of public health. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Court distin-
guished “an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances,
wholly freed from restraint,” with what it labeled “[r]eal liberty”:
Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle
which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his
own, whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of
the injury that may be done to others. This court has more than
once recognized it as a fundamental principle that “persons and
property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in
order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
State . . . .”347
It is then liberty regulated by law.348 The Court based its reasoning on public “self-
defense,” noting that “a community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic
341 See also Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.
342 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
343 Cf. Lockaway, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 626 (noting the government’s action was “manifestly
unreasonable, not just because of its devastating economic impact on Lockaway, but also because
it deprived Lockaway of a meaningful opportunity to attempt to protect its property rights”).
344 See, e.g., TrinCo Inv. Co. v. United States, 722 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
345 See id.
346 See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26–28 (1905).
347 Id. at 26.
348 See id. at 26–28.
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of disease which threatens the safety of its members.”349 In other words, the principle
that Justice Scalia referred to in Lucas as a “background principle[] of the State’s law
of property and nuisance.”350 If someone cannot protect their body from being
physically invaded except by paying a fine, a court is not likely to conclude that an
owner can use her property in a way that is arguably harmful to others.351 The difference
between the usual rational basis police power test for an injunction352 and the necessity
defense to a claim for compensation is that in the latter, the claim of necessity is not
just tested for a “conceivable case,” but for actual, factual support in the record.353
The Kingdom of Hawaii Supreme Court’s approach in King v. Tong Lee354 is a
good example of how modern courts will likely consider arguments about the reach
of government power. I cite this example simply because it is the first case, as far
as I can tell, in which that court employed the phrase “police power,” and in which
it upheld the broad power of government to limit the uses of property, as long as
there are some facts to support the assertion that the property’s use was contrary to
the public health.355 The Supreme Court of the Kingdom was governed both by
Hawaii’s common law (which was expressly based on English precedent), as well
as a constitution modeled in parts after the U.S. Constitution.356 Thus, decisions
from that court should be fairly good representations of how police power was
viewed historically by both systems. In Tong Lee, the Kingdom’s legislature pro-
hibited any laundry business within a small radius of a particular street intersection
in downtown Honolulu, because “the increasing number of laundries and wash-houses
within the limits of the City of Honolulu tends to the propagation and dissemination
of disease.”357 It just so happened that this radius encompassed Honolulu’s Chinatown,
349 Id. at 27.
350 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) (“A law or decree with
such an effect must, in other words, do no more than duplicate the result that could have been
achieved in the courts—by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under
the State’s law of private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to abate
nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise.”).
351 See id.; Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27.
352 See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28 (Although the government’s powers cannot be exercised
in “an arbitrary, unreasonable manner,” or “go so far beyond what was reasonably required
for the safety of the public,” the courts generally do not seriously question another branch’s
conclusions and prohibit them from acting.).
353 See id. at 23–24; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
354 4 Haw. 335 (1880) (en banc).
355 Id. at 339–40, 343.
356 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 1-1 (2021) (“The common law of England, as ascertained by
English and American decisions, is declared to be the common law of the State of Hawaii
in all cases, except as otherwise expressly provided by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or by the laws of the State, or fixed by Hawaiian judicial precedent, or established by
Hawaiian usage; provided that no person shall be subject to criminal proceedings except as
provided by the written laws of the United States or of the State.”).
357 Tong Lee, 4 Haw. at 335–36.
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leading to what was probably a well-founded belief that the prohibition was more
of an anti-Chinese measure than an action truly designed to protect the public
health.358 After all, the Kingdom only barred laundering for money (it did not limit
large-scale private washing or the dumping of wastewater within the radius), nor did
it prohibit commercial laundries elsewhere on the island or the kingdom, both of
which a measure truly for the public health would likely have included.359
Lee challenged the statute as a violation of the due process clause of the Hawaii
Constitution.360 He asserted his right to use his property (his laundry business and
his land), which this statute unreasonably deprived him of without a good reason: if
public health was the real reason for this law, it was both too narrow (it did not pro-
hibit all commercial laundries), and was not tailored (there was no showing that Lee’s
laundry was unsanitary).361 The Supreme Court easily disposed of this argument:
The authority to enact a law of this character is derived from
the inherent power which every sovereign State possesses to
protect the life, property and health of its citizens. Says Judge
Shaw: “We think it is a well settled principle, growing out of the
nature of well-ordered civil society, that every holder of prop-
erty, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it
under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to
the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoy-
ment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community.
Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights,
are subject to such reasonable limitations on their enjoyment as
shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable
restraints and regulations established by law as the Legislature,
under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the
Constitution, may think necessary and expedient.”
“This is very different from the right of eminent domain; the
right of a Government to take and appropriate private property
whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be done
only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation there-
for. The power we allude to is rather the police power; the power
vested in the Legislature by the Constitution to make, ordain,
358 See id. at 338 (noting that the prohibition is between Nuuanu and King streets); John
C. Derrick, Honolulu’s Chinatown, GUIDE US OAHU, https://www.hawaii-guide.com/oahu
/sights/chinatown [https://perma.cc/6EUH-7RMB] (noting that modern Honolulu’s Chinatown
includes Nuuanu and King streets).
359 Tong Lee, 4 Haw. at 335–37.
360 Id. at 342–43.
361 Id. at 341–43.
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and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not re-
pugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good
and welfare of the commonwealth, or the subjects of the same.”362
There is a lot about Tong Lee that has not necessarily survived the 140 years since
it was issued: the racial overtones, for example.363 But the police power principle is
still a very strong thread, and the court’s holding remains the general approach today:
The State, by its Legislature, possesses the right to make such
laws as it deems to be wholesome, and the exercise of this power
is subject to no review except by the body of society itself, ex-
cept so far as these laws may be inhibited by the Constitution
itself, or be repugnant to its provisions.364
If halting the action is the remedy sought, petitioning the government and vot-
ing—not suing—is the usual remedy.365
362 Id. at 339–40 (quoting Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 84 (1851));
see also id. at 341 (“Chief Justice Shaw also says: ‘Nor does the prohibition of such noxious
use of property (a prohibition imposed because such use would be injurious to the public),
although it may diminish the profits of the owner, make it an appropriation to a public use,
so as to entitle the owner to compensation. . . . But he is restrained, not because the public
have occasion to make the like use or make any use of the property, or to take any benefit
or profit to themselves from it, but because it would be a noxious use, contrary to the maxim
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.’” (quoting Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) at 86)).
363 See also id. at 338; Derrick, supra note 358.
364 Id. at 342.
365 Certainly today, if Lee challenged a similar measure he might have a better chance
were he to press an equal protection claim, but he did not, unlike the plaintiffs in two cases
that arose later in a similar circumstance. For example, in Wong Wai v. Williamson, 103 F.
384 1, 2–3, 10 (N.D. Cal. 1900), and Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10, 11–12 (N.D. Cal. 1900),
the court enjoined enforcement of a San Francisco ordinance that was based on the city of-
ficials’ beliefs “that danger does exist to the health of the citizens of the city and county of San
Francisco by reason of the existence of germs of the [plague] remaining in the district hereafter
mentioned [Chinatown].” Jew Ho, 103 F. at 12. San Francisco supported the ordinance by
referring to Mugler and the city’s police powers. Id. at 17–18. But that case did not serve as
a trump card because the plaintiffs alleged and proved that the ordinance was not reasonably
designed to protect the public health, but really was targeted racial discrimination:
The evidence here is clear that this is made to operate against the Chinese
population only, and the reason given for it is that the Chinese may
communicate the disease from one to the other. That explanation, in the
judgment of the court, is not sufficient. It is, in effect, a discrimination,
and it is the discrimination that has been frequently called to the attention
of the federal courts where matters of this character have arisen with
respect to Chinese.
Id. at 23.
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Even in “normal” times, if lacking Loretto or Lucas facts, it is very difficult to
win a regulatory takings claim for compensation.366 In the midst of emergencies, the
courts may be even more reluctant to provide a remedy, even where they should. But
even if these types of regulatory takings claims are, absent some unusual circum-
stances, unlikely to succeed (at least under current judicial understandings of the
scope of the Just Compensation Clause), they do serve an essential function as a public
reminder of the Constitution’s check on the “ratchet” effect of accepting acquies-
cence to emergency measures.367
CONCLUSION
Under the current approach, most takings claims in normal times present tough
cases for compensation.368 In emergencies—when courts may be even more deferen-
tial to governmental assertions of power—these claims may be even more challeng-
ing.369 But it need not be so, on either ground. In emergencies, a court applying Penn
Central’s factors should afford no greater deference to the government’s claimed
police power rationale than in cases involving the routine exercise of the power.370
If there is an emergency, property owners should only be forced to suffer more than
their proportionate share of the burden if the government can show that the emer-
gency is genuine, the taking responds to the emergency, and the action is as narrow
as possible.371
366 See, e.g., Support Working Animals, Inc. v. DeSantis, 457 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1215 (N.D.
Fla. 2020) (“The enactment of Amendment 13 [which bars wagering on dog racing] repre-
sents a valid exercise of Florida’s police power and is therefore not a ‘taking.’”).
367 See Higgs & Twight, supra note 1, at 747 (“Derogations from private rights that
occurred during national emergencies often remained after the crises had passed. A ‘ratchet’
took hold. People adjusted first their actions, then their thinking, to accommodate themselves
to emergency governmental controls. Later, lacking the previous degree of public support,
private property rights failed to regain their pre-crisis scope.”).
368 See supra Part I.
369 See supra Part II.
370 See supra Part III.
371 See supra Part IV.
